October 30, 2005

  • 2,000 Dead in Iraq




    Jim Wilson/The New York Times

    Jeffrey A. Williams, 20, was killed by a bomb. His mother, Sandra Williams-Smith, at home in Mansfield, Tex., says that she supported her son's ambition, but that she never supported the war. Her feelings are shared by many other African-Americans, according to polls and military experts.



    Jim Wilson/The New York Times

    Jeffrey B. Starr died in a firefight. His father, Brian Starr, pictured, said his son believed in the war, but was tired of the harsh life. So he enrolled in community college, planning to attend after his enlistment ended in August. He was killed in April on his third tour in Iraq.


    2,000 Dead: As Iraq Tours Stretch On, a Grim Mark




    Sgt. Anthony G. Jones, fresh off the plane from Iraq and an impish grin on his face, sauntered unannounced into his wife's hospital room in Georgia just hours after she had given birth to their second son.


    For two joyous weeks in May, Sergeant Jones cooed over their baby and showered attention on his wife. But he also took care of unfinished business, selling his pickup truck to retire a loan, paying off bills, calling on family and friends.


    "I want to live this week like it is my last," he told his wife.


    Three weeks later, on June 14, Sergeant Jones was killed by a roadside bomb in Baghdad on his third tour in a war that is not yet three years old. He was 25.


    "It was like he knew he wouldn't come back," said his grandmother, Ima Lee Jones, who buried Sergeant Jones beside towering oaks near her home in Sumter, S.C. "He told me, 'Grandma, the chances of going over a third time and coming back alive are almost nil. I've known too many who have died.' "


    Sergeant Jones's tale may be unusual in its heartbreaking juxtaposition of birth and death, but it has become increasingly common among the war dead in one important way: one in five of the troops who have been killed were in their second, third, fourth or fifth tours of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan.


    Many of those service members returned voluntarily to war because they burned with conviction in the rightness of the mission. Others were driven by powerful loyalty to units and friends. For some it was simply their job.


    But as the nation pays grim tribute today to the 2,000 service members killed in Iraq since the invasion of 2003, their collective stories describe the painful stresses and recurring strains that an extended conflict, with all its demands for multiple tours, is placing on families, towns and the military itself as they struggle to console the living while burying the dead.


    "Two tours is more than you should ask anyone to do," said Randall Shafer, 51, an oil industry consultant from Houston whose son, Lance Cpl. Eric Shafer of the Marines, just finished his second tour in Iraq. "They know they could die anywhere at any time. That will take a toll on anybody. And it takes a toll on their families."


    The milestone of 2,000 dead was marked yesterday by a moment of silence in the Senate, and President Bush said that "the best way to honor the sacrifice of our fallen troops is to complete the mission." But the nation seems as divided over the war as it did in September 2004, when the 1,000th death occurred in the midst of a heated presidential campaign.


    The differences between the first 1,000 and the second 1,000 dead illuminate recent trends regarding who is serving in Iraq, who is dying and how the war is progressing.


    Most strikingly, death has come quicker, a sign of the insurgency's increasing efficiency. While it took 18 months to reach 1,000 dead, it has taken just 14 to reach 2,000. More powerful and sophisticated explosive devices are a major reason, causing nearly half of the deaths in the second group.


    Whites, who represent the vast majority of combat troops, accounted for a larger share of the dead among the most recent 1,000, about three out of four. Blacks and Hispanics died at a somewhat slower rate over the last year.


    More than 420 service members, the majority of them marines and soldiers, have died while on repeat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. That number is expected to climb steadily as the Pentagon continues to rotate its main front-line combat battalions into Iraq.


    The Marine Corps suffered a particularly heavy toll, accounting for a third of the second 1,000 deaths, though marines represent less than 20 percent of the American force in Iraq. Marines have been stationed in some of Iraq's most violent precincts and assigned to lead dangerous anti-insurgent sweeps in restive Sunni areas like Falluja.


    The nation's part-time warriors in the National Guard and the Reserve also shouldered a larger burden, accounting for about 30 percent of the deaths, an increase of more than 10 percentage points. The heavier toll came as Guard and Reserve forces were called to combat in larger numbers than at any other time since Vietnam, a role the Pentagon plans to scale back in the coming year.


    Every state in the country was represented on the roster of the dead, as were Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, Guam, Micronesia, the Virgin Islands and American Samoa. California and Texas had the most deaths, as they did for the first 1,000, followed by New York, Ohio and Pennsylvania. At least 17 of the last 1,000 dead were women.


    For Iraqis, too, the death toll seems to have accelerated. Estimates for Iraqis are not precise and are subject to much controversy. But according to figures compiled by the allied military forces in Iraq and analyzed by Anthony H. Cordesman, a military expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, a nonprofit research group, Iraqis have suffered on average more than 50 casualties a day in 2005, including wounded and dead, compared with fewer than 40 a day in 2004.


    Iraq Body Count, a nonprofit organization, estimates that 26,000 to 30,000 Iraqi civilians including police officers have died in the entire conflict, though it does not have a figure for military personnel.


    Multiple deployments have clearly embittered some American families, driving them to push their children and spouses to quit the military. But others say the willingness, sometimes sheer determination, of loved ones to return to battle has made them see a deeper value in the mission, no matter how deadly or open-ended it may seem.


    "I thought initially that we should never have gone to war," said Karen Strain, 51, of North Hero, Vt., whose son, Cpl. Adam J. Strain of the Marines, was killed by a sniper in August.


    "But now I feel we have to finish the job," Ms. Strain said, pausing to fight back tears. "Adam gave me more insight for how sad it is for those people, and how we can help give them their freedom. Adam changed my views."



    Multiple Tours


    With Each One, Death Seems to Loom Larger



    It was the tour that was not supposed to happen.


    Last year, Sergeant Jones signed a contract with the Army certifying that he would be sent to Kentucky to be trained as a scout and then deployed to Germany. He had already served two tours driving heavy equipment into Iraq from Kuwait, and his wife was pregnant with their second child.


    But his unit, the 104th transportation company of the Third Infantry Division, was short of soldiers, and at the last minute the Army changed his orders, dispatching him to Iraq. He dutifully deployed in February, while complaining bitterly about the Army's broken promises and voicing deep concerns about poor equipment.


    "He was angry, angrier than I've ever heard," said Ima Lee Jones, his grandmother. "He said, 'I don't mind going. But what the insurgents haven't blown up or burned, we can't get parts to fix. The trucks can't drive more than 40 miles per hour. It's like having a bull's-eye on the door.' "


    Sergeant Jones was driving one of those trucks when it was shattered by a roadside bomb on June 14, killing him.


    Like Sergeant Jones, more than 300,000 American troops have served more than one tour of duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, most of them in Iraq. But just how those troops and their families are coping with repeat tours is the subject of much study and debate, as repeated deployments to a war zone are a relatively new phenomenon.


    In World War II, many service members deployed for the entire war. In Vietnam, conscripts typically served single 12-month tours, rotating through units that remained at war. It was only after 1973, with the all-volunteer military, that the Pentagon began rotating entire units overseas, theorizing that battalions that trained and deployed together would be more cohesive.


    Iraq and Afghanistan are the first conflicts since 1973 to demand large continuous rotations of troops.


    In dozens of interviews, parents and spouses described the seven-month Marine or 12-month Army deployments to Iraq as periods of unremitting tension.


    Roberto Rivera of Chicago, the father of a recently returned marine, said he jogged every day to relieve stress, losing 40 pounds over a seven-month tour. Thomas Southwick of San Diego said he stopped watching the news during his marine son's third tour of duty, which ended in September.


    "You're just a constant nervous wreck," Mr. Southwick said, "waiting for a knock on the door."


    Many parents said they found second and third deployments more gut-wrenching than first ones, partly because they had learned from their children about the gruesome realities of war, and partly because death seemed to loom larger with each tour.


    "How many times can you go out there and be so lucky?" Diana Olson of Elk Grove Village, Ill., said she told her 21-year-old son, Cpl. John T. Olson of the Marines, after his second tour. But he re-enlisted in 2004, only to be killed when a bomb caused his truck to tip over last February on his third tour.


    So far, the emotional turmoil of repeated deployments has not taken a toll on re-enlistment rates for the Army or the Marine Corps, which provide most of the American forces in Iraq. Both exceeded their re-enlistment goals this year, aided by signing bonuses of $20,000 and more. But many experts said that could change if the war dragged on and troops were asked to serve more tours in combat.


    "Multiple tours have long been a problem for families," said Morten G. Ender, a sociologist at the United States Military Academy at West Point. "And these are dangerous, high-stress tours."


    Like many other soldiers, Sergeant Jones was fatalistic about his third tour, telling his wife, Kelly, that he had "a bad feeling" about returning to Iraq. While there, he wrote letters and journal entries musing on death. His wife found one among his belongings after his death.


    "Grieve little and move on," he counseled her. "I shall be looking over you. And you will hear me from time to time on the gentle breeze that sounds at night, and in the rustle of leaves."


    Mrs. Jones, 26, said she struggled at first to contain her anger that her husband was sent to Iraq instead of Germany. But she has consoled herself with the conviction that he died for a cause he supported. And she firmly rejects the antiwar protests of Cindy Sheehan, saying they dishonor the fallen.


    "I hope she doesn't have my husband's name on a cross," Mrs. Jones said. "My husband, if he had a choice, that's how he would want to die. As a soldier."



    Race


    As Opposition Rises, Black Enlistment Falls


    Sandra Williams-Smith never supported the invasion of Iraq, even though she is married to a former Air Force sergeant and has worked on military bases as a nurse. But Mrs. Williams-Smith kept her views mostly to herself, particularly after her oldest son, Jeffrey A. Williams, joined the Army out of high school in 2003. He saw the military as a steppingstone to becoming a doctor, and she encouraged his ambition.


    But on Sept. 5, Specialist Williams, a 20-year-old medic, was killed by a roadside bomb in Tal Afar, Iraq. Mrs. Williams-Smith, 42, is silent no more. Though her oldest living son is in the Navy, and her youngest son wants to join the Marines, she openly rages against the war and President Bush.


    "It's time to bring these boys home," said Mrs. Williams-Smith, of Mansfield, Tex. "My feelings for Bush are harsh. He should have taken care of the needs of his own people before going across the ocean to take care of someone else's."


    The anger Mrs. Williams-Smith, who is black, feels toward the war is shared by many other African-Americans, according to polls, military officials and experts. And that opposition is beginning to have a profound effect on who is joining the military - and potentially who is dying in Iraq, many experts say.


    For most of the last three decades, blacks joined the military in disproportionately high numbers, either because they saw it as an equal-opportunity employer or were attracted by its training programs and college benefits. The Army in particular came to rely heavily on blacks to fill its ranks: in the 1980's, about 30 percent of active-duty soldiers were black, Pentagon statistics show.


    But black enlistment has fallen off, particularly in the Army, and the war in Iraq is hastening that decline, military officials and experts say. Lower black enlistment means that the military looks more like the United States in terms of racial balance than it did a decade ago, when it was disproportionately black.


    This year, about 14 percent of new Army recruits were black, down from nearly 23 percent in 2001. Army officials say improved job opportunities in other fields is one reason. But a study commissioned by the Army last year also concluded that more young blacks were rejecting military service because they opposed the war, or feared dying in it.


    "More African-Americans identify having to fight for a cause they don't support as a barrier to military service," the study concluded.


    Not all blacks feel that way. Specialist Toccara R. Green joined the junior R.O.T.C. as an ebullient freshman at a Baltimore high school and became enraptured with the discipline and camaraderie of military life. Even after Specialist Green, 23, was killed by a roadside bomb in August, her parents continued to see the Army as a proud and honorable career.


    "Toccara hated Iraq, but she loved the military," her mother, Yvonne, said. "It was in her blood."


    Polls indicate that support for the war has dropped among whites as well. But the disparity between blacks and whites is immense: while 45 percent of whites said the invasion was a mistake, 77 percent of blacks felt that way, according to a New York Times/CBS News poll conducted last month.


    As black enlistment has declined, whites have come to represent a larger share of the Army's lowest enlisted ranks, and a larger part of the dead: 78 percent for the second 1,000, up from 70 percent in the first 1,000. The death rate for Hispanics and blacks declined in the second group.


    Some experts say the increase in white deaths cannot be attributed solely to lower black recruitment, asserting that more study is needed before any conclusions are drawn. But there is broad agreement among military experts that if black enlistment continues to fall, it could create long-term manpower problems for the Army.


    In many ways, Patricia Roberts is hoping that will be the case.


    Ms. Roberts's son, Specialist Jamaal R. Addison, was part of the invasion of 2003 when his convoy was ambushed by Iraqi forces near Nasiriya. The attack became famous because six soldiers, including Pfc. Jessica D. Lynch, were captured. But nine others from the unit died during and after the ambush, including Specialist Addison, who was 22.


    After his death, Ms. Roberts, 45, said she lost her job as a customer service representative because she frequently broke down in tears. After much prayer, she resolved to devote her life to offering alternatives to military service to young blacks.


    Since then, she has formed a nonprofit foundation named after her son and begun raising money for mentoring, motivational and scholarship programs. Ms. Roberts, who lives near Atlanta, says she will not discourage anyone from joining the military for patriotic reasons. But too many blacks, including her son, have joined solely for the paycheck or college tuition, she asserts.


    "If they are saying, 'There's nothing out there, I'm going to end up selling drugs, I can't get a job,' that's when I want to talk to them," she said. "To show them that there are other ways."


    Sgt. Jonathan B. Shields, 25, might have been one of those people. The eldest of four children raised by a divorced mother, he saw the military as a way out of his low-income, high-crime section of Atlanta. After marrying a woman with three children in 2003, he also began to see it as a career, re-enlisting while in Iraq last year.


    He died in Falluja last November after an American tank ran into him.


    His mother, Evelyn Allen, 48, of Decatur, Ga., said she had been unable to work since Sergeant Shields's death. Ms. Allen has sought to relieve her grief by participating in antiwar rallies. But she fears that her protests will not shorten the war. So she is focusing on a more attainable goal: preventing her three living children from joining the military.


    "They would not even think about it," Ms. Allen said. "Our loss is just too drastic."



    Marines


    A Love for the Corps, but Weary of the War


    From the time he was a child in California playing with G.I. Joe's, to the day he watched the World Trade Center collapse as a high school freshman, Adam Strain knew he wanted to join the Marine Corps.


    Horrified that he was so determined to go to war, his parents pushed him to think about college, acting or even modeling. He was tall, athletic and handsome, and the Gap put him in print ads during his junior year of high school in California. By his senior year, an agent thought he could land a part in a hit television show, "Dawson's Creek."


    But he was also idealistic, and when a Marine Corps recruiter described the suffering of Iraqi children, he signed up just before graduating from high school in 2003.


    "He said, 'I can always do the modeling and acting when I come back,' " said his mother, who now lives in Vermont. " 'This is what I'm needed for now.' "


    When Ms. Strain asked why he did not join the Navy to avoid combat, he replied, "I want to be on the front line."


    Lance Corporal Strain was killed by a sniper in Ramadi on Aug. 3. He was two weeks short of his 21st birthday, six weeks short of coming home from his second tour of duty.


    His unit, the First Battalion of the Fifth Marine Regiment, or the 1/5, is one of the most battered units in the service that has proportionately taken the heaviest death toll in the war. In three deployments to Iraq, including the invasion, the battalion has suffered about 20 deaths, all but six of those in its most recent tour, which ended in September.


    One of the first units to enter Iraq during the invasion, the battalion returned when the insurgency gained momentum in 2004. That April, the 1/5 assisted in the assault on Falluja that left more than 50 Americans dead. It returned early this year to patrol the streets of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province, where nearly 700 American troops have been killed, the most of any Iraqi province.


    Despite the repeated deployments and heavy casualties, Marine Corps officers say that morale in the 1/5 remains high and that its re-enlistment rate remains strong.


    But at a homecoming celebration for 260 members of the 1/5 at Camp Pendleton in late September, many parents who said they loved the Marine Corps also expressed deep weariness with the war, and said they hoped their children had had enough, too.


    Bob Krieger, 53, a corporate pilot from near Grand Rapids, Mich., said that during two tours in Iraq, his son had seen a friend shot dead, retrieved the bodies of fellow marines blown to pieces by roadside bombs and endured close calls of his own, including having a rocket-propelled grenade shot through his pant leg.


    Now, Mr. Krieger, who initially supported the invasion, says it is time to bring the troops home. "It just feels like there is no light at the end of the tunnel," he said.


    His son, Cpl. Jeff Krieger, 23, agreed, saying he planned to leave the Marines next year. "Even $20,000 isn't enough to make me go back," Corporal Krieger said.


    Another member of the 1/5, Cpl. Jeffrey B. Starr, rejected a $24,000 bonus to re-enlist. Corporal Starr believed strongly in the war, his father said, but was tired of the harsh life and nearness of death in Iraq. So he enrolled at Everett Community College near his parents' home in Snohomish, Wash., planning to study psychology after his enlistment ended in August.


    But he died in a firefight in Ramadi on April 30 during his third tour in Iraq. He was 22.


    Sifting through Corporal Starr's laptop computer after his death, his father found a letter to be delivered to the marine's girlfriend. "I kind of predicted this," Corporal Starr wrote of his own death. "A third time just seemed like I'm pushing my chances."


    His father, Brian Starr, had been preparing a basement apartment in his home for Corporal Starr to live in after leaving the Marines. Now Mr. Starr plans to turn it into a memorial of sorts, to display Corporal Starr's war ribbons and the neatly folded flag that once draped his coffin. Perhaps he will also install a pool table there to remind people of his son's fun-loving side.


    Mr. Starr, an accountant, said he remained convinced that invading Iraq was the right thing to do. But he said he would also like firsthand confirmation that the war, and Corporal Starr's death, were not in vain.


    "I'm hoping, my wife is hoping, that we can visit Ramadi," he said, fighting back tears. "And feel safe. And feel like Jeff died for something."





  • Battle of the Sexes With Wrenches




    David R. Lutman for The New York Times

    Tabetha Salsbury, 17, the first girl to win the Chevron Delco national tractor restoration title for high school students, standing on Wednesday next to the restored tractor for which she won top honors last year

    October 29, 2005
    Battle of Sexes, With Monkey Wrenches
    By JAMES DAO

    LOUISVILLE, Ky., Oct. 28 - Tabetha Salsbury, the two-time reigning champion, was in trouble. The clock was running down, she had stumbled during her usually smooth delivery and now the judges were on the attack.

    How had she set the worm gear? What had she used to time the engine? What kinds of seals had she installed? No detail about the tractor that a distant uncle had built 73 years ago - and that she had painstakingly rebuilt to shining perfection - seemed beyond scrutiny.

    The most oil-sodden mechanic might have been flustered by the barrage. But Ms. Salsbury, 17, is the first girl to win this competition, the coveted Chevron Delo national tractor restoration title for high school students. And she is the first person of either sex to win it two years running. The room waited in hushed silence.

    Cool and composed, Ms. Salsbury, a high school senior from Pueblo, Colo., answered the first question, struggled with the second, and gave up on the third. "She blew it," her father, Hez Salsbury, muttered with obvious dismay.

    Three-peats do not come easily in any sport. But if Ms. Salsbury is no longer the national champion in restoring tractors - 18-year-old Tyler Raska of Wallis, Tex., walked off with the $2,500 first-place prize on Friday - she has been a path breaker in a once male-dominated sport that is gaining popularity in rural high schools and helping turn old tractors into big business.

    "I think my biggest accomplishment was to give a spark to other girls around the country," said Ms. Salsbury, upbeat even in defeat and sounding like a grizzled veteran despite her young age. "Women are getting their foot in the door."

    Ms. Salsbury needed only to watch the team competition to see some of the fruit of her work. Among the 10 finalists was an all-girls team from Decatur, Tex., the first in the 10-year history of the competition to win a medal.

    The Decatur girls, who finished second in the team competition, seem an unlikely bunch for the grease-monkey world of tractor restoration. One of the team's six members is a cheerleader, two were homecoming queen finalists and another was a beauty queen. Only one had ever tinkered with cars. The others claimed not to know the working end of a wrench.

    But over the course of the last year, they learned the inner anatomy of combustion engines, restored from trailer hitch to hood grille a 1950 Ferguson tractor and beat the local high school's boys team in two out of three local competitions.

    Through it all, they endured the taunts of guys, and occasionally girls, in their town of 5,000 people in the football-crazy plains of North Texas, about 60 miles outside Dallas.

    "The guys all felt like it was a joke," said Jordan Cade, a 17-year-old senior. "But once we started beating them, they started to respect us."

    Having a sense of humor helped. The girls printed brown T-shirts with pink lettering that said on the front, "My boyfriend said I had to choose between him and the tractor," and on the back, "I'm sure going to miss him."

    On Friday, however, the girls were in tears when they learned that they had finished only second. "It's bittersweet," said Rick Elmore, their coach and the father of a team member. "No one remembers who lost the World Series."

    "Sport" might seem the wrong word to describe an endeavor that entails tapping pistons, turning wrenches and spraying paint - until one sees the intensity of the competition. Serious contestants invest thousands of dollars in their machines and work with extraordinary discipline, spending hours a day on projects for months and even years, sometimes devoting entire summer vacations to finishing tractors for fall events.

    Tyler Raska, this year's individual winner, began restoring tractors when he was 12 at the urging of his father, a farmer, who had hoped he would become a better reader by poring over equipment manuals.

    He is still a weak reader, his father said. But Tyler has become a master restorer, spending hours a day on his tractors. His latest, a 1959 John Deere 630, has won seven titles, including the national Chevron Delo crown, earning him about $20,000 in cash, prizes and scholarship money. He sold an earlier project to a California farmer for $10,000.

    "That guy bought it to work on his farm, but said it was too pretty to use," Tim Raska, Tyler's father, said proudly. Tyler plans to start his own tractor-restoring business after attending technical college.

    Hez Salsbury says he is getting into the business, too. A part-time welding teacher at a community college, Mr. Salsbury, 46, believes there is a booming market in restored tractors driven by people who grew up on farms, moved to the suburbs and now want to acquire things that remind them of their childhood.

    "They put the tractors in their garages, take them to shows and it brings back fond memories," Mr. Salsbury said.

    The competition is sponsored by Chevron but held at the national convention of the F.F.A., the group once known as the Future Farmers of America. Contestants do not bring their tractors, but instead describe their projects in thick, neatly bound books filled with color photographs. They also give 20-minute oral presentations before a panel of five judges, using PowerPoint slides, laser pointers and, in some cases, music to embroider dry recitations about overhauling fuel systems.

    Ms. Salsbury tried to spice up her presentation by giving each judge a set of wood dowels, buttons and spindles that they were to assemble into tiny toy tractors. But the gift apparently did little to improve her score.

    On Thursday, she expressed dismay about her performance. But by Friday, she was philosophical, thinking ahead to college, expressing pride in the heirloom tractor she had restored and musing on her grandfather's efforts to tweak her competitive spirit.

    "He always said, 'It's O.K. for girls to restore tractors, but guys can do it better,' " she said. "He knew that would aggravate me and make me work harder."

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  • Where Maoists Still Matter




    Tomas van Houtryve for The New York Times

    Martyrs' Road, built by the people's army and "volunteers," runs through Maoist Nepal; here, celebrating the opening of the first section, in Tila, June 2005.

    October 30, 2005
    Where Maoists Still Matter
    By SOMINI SENGUPTA

    The boy wore an M-16 bullet on a thin gold chain around his neck and was unusually talkative to strangers. Around his wrist was an ammunition belt that he twirled like a bracelet. He said these were souvenirs from the battlefield at nearby Khara, after a celebrated clash a few months earlier between the People's Liberation Army and the Royal Nepalese Army.

    Mani Kendra Gharti was his name. He was 17. And he offered two reasons for having joined the Maoists earlier this year: curiosity and peer pressure. He was a student when his uncle, a party worker recently released from prison, pressed him into service. Mani was better suited to carry a tune than a rifle, and so he signed up for the party's cultural wing, took on a nom de guerre - Comrade Prabhat - and went around singing and dancing revolutionary songs from village to village, usually at schools. This is one way the party spreads its gospel and draws new members. Comrade Prabhat's decision seems to have been prompted mainly by boredom, and by this afternoon he seemed no longer convinced he had made the right move.

    "It would have been better to stay in school," he said, playing with his ammunition belt. "Once you join, you can't leave."

    My Maoist minder for the day, Ratna Mahara, overheard this and intervened. There was no peer pressure, Ratna said; Comrade Prabhat had been keen to join. Ratna didn't yell, but there was no hiding his displeasure.

    Prabhat admitted he had been curious. But he stood his ground. There was also peer pressure, he said.

    Silence. Then Ratna took him aside, whispered something that neither I nor my interpreter could hear and sent the boy into the jumble of houses across a thin spit of river. The next time I saw Comrade Prabhat it was pitch dark and he was wearing a forest green uniform, a red tie knotted loosely around his neck. A fluorescent light had been hooked up to a car battery. Prabhat and his comrades - boys in red ties, girls in red sashes, Miss Universe-style - had been persuaded to treat us to a revue, a practice run of what they would perform at an indoctrination session later that week. The dances were a hybrid of Nepali tradition and global-guerrilla pantomime. The songs fused the romanticism of Keats with the sloganeering of the Gang of Four. One song went something like this:


    The proletariat's fortress grows stronger.
    Like clouds that part and reveal the red sky, like daylight after darkness,
    There is great happiness and greenery in the forest.
    That is how happy my heart is.

    Built of small fighters with flip-flops for combat boots, suffused with rage against a long legacy of oppression based on caste and ethnicity, the Maoists' guerrilla war began nearly a decade ago in these villages of Rolpa District, in the midwestern foothills of the Himalayas. Since then, it has spread a peculiar mixture of terror and desire across the countryside, cost more than 12,000 lives and come to be arguably the most resilient and ruinous Communist insurgency in the world today.

    Nepal is a landlocked nation, slightly larger than Arkansas, pressed up against the Himalayas. Its nearly 28 million citizens are among the poorest in the world. Its system of government - after more than a decade of tumultuous semi-democracy - is, in effect, an absolute monarchy, ruled by the world's only Hindu king, Gyanendra Bikram Bir Shah Dev, a chain smoker with perpetually downturned lips. Some of his followers regard him as a direct descendant of the god Vishnu.

    Our journey from King Gyanendra's capital in Katmandu to the Maoists' capital in Rolpa took an hour by plane, nine hours by car, and nine days on foot, up and down the hills, through clouds and forest and one red-flag hamlet after another. "Any goal short of capturing the state is revisionism," screamed the red-ink graffiti on the side of one house. At each stop, Maoist cadres greeted us with an upraised fist and a lal salaam - "red salute" in Nepali. At most stops there was also a Hindu tradition of hospitality - a dash of vermilion smeared on our foreheads - and once, a rousing send-off by a marching band of barefoot Dalits, or those considered "untouchable" in the Hindu caste system. A tag team of Maoist minders accompanied us through the hills, with a promise to let us see for ourselves the fruits of their revolution. At the end of the road, on a hill above the revolutionary capital Thabang, they said, was a model Maoist school, a tiny but vital building block for the new society they sought to erect. Each of the comrades in turn urged us onward to this Xanadu.

    To most observers, it is obvious that the Maoists cannot win the war and cannot rule Nepal. But a young and infirm democracy and an increasingly discredited monarchy have together rewarded the Maoists with newfound leverage. The Nepali newspaper columnist C. K. Lal described them as "political entrepreneurs," able to exploit the cracks in the system. I asked him, Isn't a Maoist insurgency a bit retro? He told me to consider medieval Katmandu and the strange and bloody misadventures of its royal court: "We are living in a time warp. An absolute monarchy belongs to the 14th, 15th century. One anachronism invites another anachronism." Nepal has struggled to find a more viable politics than this contest between the 15th century and one of the most absurd ideological innovations of the 20th. But the circumstances of Nepal have conspired against reform - to such a degree that the Maoists may be gaining the upper hand.


    Nepal's own Tiananmen Square came in April 1990, when, in response to street protests, Gyanendra's predecessor, King Birendra, opened the doors for parliamentary elections, a new constitution and a free press. With an elected government came roads, private radio stations, aid money and ambitions among ordinary Nepalis to improve their lot. Perhaps most important, the proliferation of schools in the countryside after 1990 taught a generation of young men and women how to read and write - and become political.

    What 1990 failed to deliver was perhaps more significant for the political entrepreneurs of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist). The new constitution paid lip service to Nepal's diversity, but Hinduism remained the state religion, and calls for more local autonomy, to reflect the country's true demographic mix, were ignored. The upper-caste Brahmins and Kshatriyas - priests and warriors, respectively, in the Hindu pecking order - continued to run everything. There was no meaningful land reform. The army remained beholden to the king rather than to Parliament. Politicians, local and national, indulged in corrupt dealings. For most enterprising Nepalis, the best prospects required leaving Nepal.

    These were the considerable shortcomings that the Maoist political entrepreneurs sought to exploit. By 1994, Nepal's Communists had split. One faction, led by Prachanda - what would become the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) - was kept out of the elections. Many Nepalis regard that as the crucial moment in the political history of Communism in Nepal. Had the C.P.N. (M) been allowed to contest for power, it might never have resorted to war. By the time this was clear, however, it was too late.

    No sooner had democracy arrived in 1990 than Ratna (our party minder in the Rolpa hills) learned from his father that war was imminent. His father was a Communist old-timer and is today a member of the Prachanda faction's Central Committee. Weapons had been procured over the border in India. And even as the Communist Party of Nepal engaged the democratic system - once winning the second largest bloc of seats in Parliament - preparations for an armed confrontation were under way. In February 1996, the Maoists launched a series of coordinated attacks, starting in the midwest. In a village called Holeri, on the road from Nepalgunj to Maoist country, a gutted police post still stands as a monument to that first strike.

    Ratna remembered exactly where he was when the revolution began. He and his friends ran around their village shouting revolutionary slogans. Then some of his friends went to the next village and broke the kneecaps of some young men they considered thugs. Ratna was 14 at the time.

    For the first five years of the war, it was local police officers who fought the guerrillas and their suspected sympathizers. Then, on June 1, 2001, came the nocturnal massacre inside Narayanhiti Palace in Katmandu. King Birendra and his son, the crown prince, Dipendra, were killed. The king's brother, Gyanendra, and his family survived. Three days later, with a nation in mourning and conspiracy theories swirling under the rain clouds, Gyanendra took the throne. At his order, the Royal Nepalese Army was unleashed against the Nepalese people for the first time in history.

    In 2002, King Gyanendra dissolved Parliament. This February he imposed emergency rule, jailed some of Nepal's most prominent elected officials and vowed to crush the Maoists. But the Maoists haven't been crushed. Since emergency rule was imposed in February, 1,334 people have been killed, an average of more than five each day, according to a human rights group called Informal Sector Service Center in Katmandu. The Maoists, for their part, carried out assaults across the countryside; at the same time, they started cozying up to the sort of politicians they had once regarded as "class enemies" and often butchered. They began reaching out to Nepal's most powerful allies too - yesterday's "imperialists," from India, Britain and the United States. In early September came the Maoists' biggest surprise: a temporary cease-fire. It was a deft move designed to further isolate the king at home and abroad. By some measures, it worked; the king canceled a scheduled appearance at a summit meeting of world leaders in New York.

    Meanwhile, Katmandu witnessed a kind of Prague Spring after the suspension of emergency rule and the passing of the summer monsoons. In late August and September, street protests echoed with cries for the ouster of Gyanendra, making it increasingly apparent that, if nothing else, the king's February clampdown gave a fillip to the Maoists' principal war .. it began to turn the nation against monarchy.

    Three weeks after the Maoists' cease-fire pledge, King Gyanendra announced that local elections would be held early in 2006 and parliamentary polls a year after that. Most of the country's largest political parties - having lost patience with, and even respect for, the monarchy - agreed to boycott, and a seven-party alliance called for new talks with the Maoists.


    Initially, the Maoists' best opportunity for driving a wedge between Nepalese and the monarchy was to pay respect to those castes that a Hindu monarchy was bound to trample on. "We Dalits, we weren't even considered human beings," said an old man named Irkha Bahadur Pariyar, a tailor by birth, in Thabang, the Maoists' run-down capital. "Dogs were considered more human."

    Dalits couldn't fetch water at the upstream village tap, the old man said. They had to go to the one downstream, so as not to pollute the water for those higher up the caste ladder. Pariyar had been a tailor since age 9. His father was a tailor, too. His grandfather the same. Today, two of his three sons are migrant workers in the Persian Gulf. He doesn't know what they do, only that they left because it became impossible to stay, thanks to the constant police harassment of young men and women. A third son works for the party - as a tailor, stitching uniforms.

    Was Pariyar pleased with the party's accomplishments in Thabang? "Well, the party could have done more," he said. "They could have done better. But this is the beginning." He looked at his nephew, a member of the party's Dalit committee, and smiled. His wiry fingers returned to a pair of blue pleated trousers under his sewing machine. He complained of a backache and refused to say any more.

    The stated Maoist plan for Nepal was always a mix of leveling social relations, addressing serious grievances, imposing far-left Puritanism and promoting economic growth, if there was to be any, through either revolutionary enthusiasm or, if necessary, revolutionary violence. The party's first list of demands, presented in February 1996, was typical: a call for a new constitution and an army accountable to the government rather than the palace; calls to ban "vulgar" Hindi films from India; an end to the recruitment for foreign armies of Gurkha soldiers, most of whom hailed from the midwestern hill districts. The government ignored these demands entirely.

    In their own territory, the Maoists have instituted a raft of new laws. Untouchability is proscribed, in theory and practice. Alcohol and child marriage are banned. New polygamous marriages are not tolerated, although, depending on the local leadership, existing ones are left alone. Migrating to India in search of work is frowned upon. Legal disputes are adjudicated by a roving people's court that Nepali human rights advocates consider a travesty of justice. Policing is done by a people's militia, members of which also appeared to run Thabang's main tea shop.

    Red flags mark the gates of this guerrilla capital. Olive-colored Chairman Mao caps are sold at the People's Liberation Army cooperative, along with ammunition belts and hemp soap. Morning drills for new recruits begin with the rooster's first crow. The nearest police station or military post or post office - or indeed any sign of the authority of the Royal Kingdom of Nepal, within whose boundaries this hamlet officially sits - is a three-day hike through the hills. Chickens cross the road, back and forth. The smoke of cooking fires hangs low in the air, making everything sooty, making it hard to breathe. There is not a single child without a runny nose, and it's not even winter. Medicines are extremely difficult to ferry into these parts, thanks to military and guerrilla checkpoints along the way. The nearest doctor is a couple of days' walk.

    Up and down the jagged Rolpa hills, small girls in plastic flip-flops haul bushels of fodder and firewood on their backs. A man lugs a manual sewing machine on his shoulders across a fast-moving river, swollen from rain. As always in the weeks before the monsoon, the hills are terraced with seedlings of rice; if the sky is generous, it will be sufficient to yield enough food for maybe half the year. If they are lucky, people will eat two meals, identical, day after day: rice, lentils and maybe a side of marijuana-leaf chutney. Among the few name-brand goods you can buy at the village shops are instant noodle packets with improbably giddy names like Yum Yum and Shakalaka Boom. There is no electricity here. In one village, Ghartigaun, on the road to Thabang, there was once a telephone tower, the villagers said, but the Maoists destroyed it years ago. Outside their so-called base areas like this one in the midwestern hills, the Maoists don't hold territory for long. But for all practical purposes rural Nepal, apart from the district capitals, is theirs to rule.


    On the way to Maoist country, I stopped to see the district education office in Nepalgunj. In the last 18 months, it had been bombed "only eight times," the education officer, Vishnu Prasad Thaiba, gamely said. Of 220 instruction days in the official school calendar, classes had actually been in session for 150 days. Two teachers had disappeared. (Last year, according to the United Nations, Nepal had the largest number of new disappearance cases in the world.)

    A little farther up into the hills, the principal of a primary school said that all his teachers recently had been whisked off to a weeklong Maoist training program. In the neighboring district of Dang, a teacher's corpse was found beheaded this summer; the Maoists evidently suspected him of spying.

    Routinely, the Maoists' student wing - Ratna was among its leaders - sent Thaiba a list of demands: hire more teachers, install toilets and gyms, ban the singing of the national anthem. Thaiba refused to be engaged in a conversation about the merits of their education agenda. "I take information only," Thaiba said dryly. "I don't have any opinions, any ideas."

    Why? I asked.

    "I will be lost," he said. "I will be disappeared. My family will not see my corpse."

    The portraits of 13 successive kings of Nepal hung on his wall. Thaiba was a cheerful man, with the short-sleeved gray safari suit of a lifelong civil servant and, considering his surroundings, a wry sense of humor. Earlier that week, bombs had been hurled at three public schools - there were only explosions and no damage, he said - and he nimbly led us downstairs and onto the parking lot to point out the private school across the road. It had been bombed a few weeks earlier.

    Why this intense revolutionary focus on schools? For the Maoists, schools represent a vital source of both revenue and recruits. Teachers, often the most influential elites in rural communities, can either be roped in as allies or eliminated as enemies. (Tulsi Kumari Dangi, a Nepali language teacher we met along the road, said it was routine practice for all teachers to give 5 percent of their salaries every month, plus the entirety of their annual bonus.) Public schools are also the last vestige of His Majesty's government across the Nepali countryside. And, of course, schools in an almost media-free rural society are the best place to assert control over the public mind.

    The Maoists have shut down many schools, particularly the fee-paying private schools that have mushroomed in recent years. They have ferried away students and teachers for indoctrination and forced labor. They have brought their Communist song-and-dance shows to schoolyards. They have made children dig trenches around schools in preparation for what they regard to be an imminent, final military onslaught. A Unicef survey of one war-torn district found that the number of children who showed up for year-end exams had dropped by nearly half. To Unicef officials, this signaled that children were either not coming to school at all, or that their instruction days had shrunk so much that they no longer bothered to sit for the year-end exams. The gains made in the last decade to get children into schools, they concluded, were at risk of being lost. I learned in Thabang that no one in the last two years had passed the national 10th-grade matriculation exam, a benchmark recognized as the completion of formal schooling.

    Maoists will tell you that the "feudal" education system of the "old regime" is not worth saving anyway. They are preparing for a new day. Sanskrit will be outlawed. Royal history will be replaced with people's history. Teachers will impart practical training and revolutionary values: patriotism, selflessness and the principles of "scientific Communism." A Katmandu-based television journalist, Kishore Nepal, was shown a copy of the model curriculum on one of his trips into Maoist country. The fourth-grade syllabus contained an introduction to dialectical materialism, poetry about Maoist martyrs and an introduction to homemade guns. Fifth graders would learn about the Spartacus revolt and receive a primer on "explosives, grenades and booby traps."

    On our second morning in Thabang, we trudged an hour uphill for a look at the model school that our Maoist minders had promised to show us. Its doors were bolted. Benches and cots were piled hurly-burly inside classrooms. The outhouse had never been used. The teachers, I was told, were elsewhere, receiving training; where, they couldn't say. The books were being printed; where, they couldn't say either. Conveniently enough, the students had already gone home for summer holiday. As an afterthought, the chief of Rolpa District produced two orphans, ages 7 and 12, who nervously nodded when asked if they were studying at the Maoist school. They did not recall when they had last been in class.


    In the early 1970's, when I was a child in Calcutta, Maoism was sweeping through our part of India - and through parts of my family. The uncles I knew from that time lived with peasants in the countryside, and when, occasionally, they turned up to visit us in the city, smoking cheap cigarettes and carrying hand-woven shoulder bags, they taught me not nursery rhymes but marching songs for the revolution. Once, while sitting with my mother in a sari shop in Calcutta, I broke out into one such song. My mother thinks the lyrics had something to do with a red sun rising. Whatever it was, it was not safe for a 3-year-old to be singing in a sari shop in Calcutta. Terrified, she scooped me off the counter, ran from the shop and jumped onto the nearest rickshaw. My singing uncles went underground and some were soon dead. In 1975, as emergency rule was declared in India, my family left the country.

    In the 30 years since, vast changes have swept through South Asian life and politics, but the Maoists, with their songs, their hubris and their grungy hand-woven shoulder bags, have held on, even flourished. Amid the economic boom in India, Maoist guerrillas thrive across a vast crescent of forest and countryside stretching from Andhra Pradesh in the center of the subcontinent northeast to Bihar and Bengal. Their advance is slow, but they have endured, and they will kill those who seem to oppose them - usually local policemen. Meanwhile, in the years since the Berlin Wall fell and Communism was declared dead, Nepal's Maoist insurgency has blossomed.

    I met Comrade Huri on one of my last days in Maoist country, on the morning that she and her fellow soldiers of the People's Liberation Army had stationed themselves in a village called Tila, for the landmark inauguration of the first completed stretch of the road the party was building through Rolpa. Her real name was Tika Gharti Magar, and she was 24.

    She said she was a teenager when the police came around her village, not far from here, and singled out Communists and their sympathizers for harassment. The first time they arrested her, she was accused of writing Maoist slogans on the village wall and threatened with life imprisonment. Once, when she and some local kids defeated some officers in an impromptu volleyball contest, the police cursed and searched their schoolbags. If the police hadn't harassed her people like that, she told me, perhaps her life would have taken a different turn. "The only alternative was to join the Maoists," she said.

    In eighth grade, Tika Gharti Magar dropped out of school. By the time police officers came to arrest her a second time, she had left home. She joined the party's student wing, then the women's wing; then, at age 18, she became a full-fledged fighter. "As it is, there is so much suppression, and on top of that, I am a woman," she said, dressed in fatigues and a pair of cheery lilac-colored plastic sandals. "I thought I must go for real war for women's liberation, for class struggle. I am young. I understand my country's problems. I needed some military experience."

    What's it like being a woman in the P.L.A.? First, she said, "our party has a policy of total equality." Then she said that sometimes, young male recruits had a bit of trouble following orders from a woman. She also told me how radically her own life had changed since she stepped into uniform. Before, in her village, if she wanted to go out somewhere, she would have to be escorted by a friend or one of her brothers. Today, she is a platoon commander, with 25 soldiers under her authority. At dawn this morning, she was on a ridge, keeping watch over these hills, in case of an enemy attack.

    I asked her about her ambitions for the future. She looked bewildered, as if despite her training and her confidence she hadn't bothered to think about who she would be after the revolution. "Whatever the party decides" was her final answer.

    Not everyone would make her choice, even if the alternative consisted of flight, immiseration and fear. Lal Chandra Jaisi's story was typical. A formerly well-to-do farmer and a supporter of the Nepali Congress Party, Jaisi said he had for years been friends with the local Maoists in his village, Dhayankot. They stayed in one of his homes. His daughters-in-law cooked for them. They debated politics with his family, and Jaisi was on their side on many issues. The idea of equality, he said, still appeals to him.

    "It's the violence I don't like, all this destruction of infrastructure, the coercion, the attacks against political workers - all this I don't like," he told me in a refugee camp made of poles and blue tarps.

    He experienced coercion up close one night when his Maoist friends suddenly asked that he turn over his three sons to the party. His sons fled to India. The Maoists retaliated, beating him up and seizing his house, his shop, his apple trees and his beehives. That's when he fled, too, with his wife, three daughters-in-law and two grandchildren. He had no intention of staying in this swampy camp. But he has no other place to go.


    The Maoists have climbed down from their original demand of a "people's democracy." They have invited political parties to resume working in their base areas and, as one of the party's Central Committee members put it, they have promised not to look at the politicians against whom they once waged war "with yesterday's eyes." Informal talks between the parties and Maoist emissaries have already begun.

    The guerrillas' commander in chief, Prachanda, does not come out of hiding to talk to journalists. But in an e-mail interview, he insisted that while the ultimate aim of his movement remained the ushering in of Communism, adjustments would be made to suit the times. "Right now we are fighting against the remnant of medieval feudalism represented by an autocratic monarchy," an e-mail message read. "So, our immediate aim is to liberate the masses from the yoke of feudal autocracy."

    Born Pushpa Kamal Dahal and trained in agricultural science, Prachanda had once been employed on a U.S.A.I.D.-financed rural-development project in these midwestern hills. Today his insurgency, combined with the growing protests against the king, has placed Prachanda and his movement in a particularly advantaged position. He is not inclined to be cast into the dustbin of failed revolutions. He is willing, he says, to work within the confines of what the Maoists call "bourgeois democracy."

    "We are quite serious to develop our ideology so as to face the challenges posed by the situation of 21st century," Prachanda wrote.

    Prachanda's friend from college days, Prasanta - a Central Committee member I met on my way to Thabang - told me there was no need for anyone to fear their party. "We have said what we mean by people's democracy," he said. "It is a multiparty people's democracy." Nepali politicians ought to trust the revolutionaries, he added; they ought to know by now they have no choice. "We have emerged as a big force," he said flatly.

    It was hard to imagine how and why the Maoists would give up the control they had won, especially the total hold over these hills they call their base areas, and more important, how they will persuade the thoroughly indoctrinated rank-and-file fighters to abandon war before a total takeover of the state. The hubris of a young cadre, Comrade Azad, was typical: Nepal, he told me, would be "the base area" for worldwide Maoist revolution.

    Moreover, whether the Maoists will actually share power in a democratic system, or take up the gun again if they lose at the polls, remains a critical subject of dispute. "I don't know if they know what they will settle for," said one senior diplomat involved in talks with all sides in the conflict. "In private, they can be quite candid. They understand their own limits. They understand the need for a political way out."

    They also need to show they can build as well as destroy. The Nepalese state has decayed so far that it, too, needs to prove that it is good for something other than retaining military power. And so the Maoists and the state are engaged in a contest to see who can build a better road. The Royal Nepalese Army has also been building one just northwest of Maoist country. A German aid group was working on a road in Rolpa District until harassment from local Maoist leaders prompted it to pull out. The party's own Martyrs' Road is slated to connect Nuwagaon, the southernmost village under Maoist control, 56 miles up to Thabang. The Maoists have used some of their precious explosives to blast through the toughest stretches of mountain, but the rest is done by conscripted labor crews. They are cutting a road through the Himalayas with their bare hands.

    One morning, not far from Nuwagaon, I watched a man with a hammerhead drill disembowel the side of a mountain. The underside of the rock shone with specks of silver and mauve. On another stretch of road, close to Tila, I watched small boys and hunch-backed old women erecting a reinforcement wall under the gravel trail, one stone at a time.

    The construction crew was not unlike a chain gang. Each family in Maoist territory was required to send one person for a 15-day shift. They were responsible for their own food and lodging, which meant hauling their own rice on their backs and sleeping under a tree. Several road workers said this was already their second shift of the year. For this crew, who had walked two days from their home village, the Martyrs' Road would bring no direct benefit: they used another gravel road, only two hours' walk from their village.

    Aiber Pun, 54, a farmer like the rest of his crewmates, said he had sent his 17-year-old daughter on the last work call. He didn't have the heart to send her a second time, he said.

    Are you happy about the road project? I asked.

    He cracked a slight smile and fetched another rock."What can I say? They said to come and do a development project. So we come."

    On inauguration morning, Comrade Huri and her fellow P.L.A. soldiers were posted around the hills surrounding Tila. New gates had been erected, streamers hung and the portraits of the party gods (Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao) had been placed on the table set aside for V.I.P.'s. There was some anxiety about the prospect of an air attack, but a thick cloud cover, Comrade Huri told me, meant the chance was slim.

    Soon, the first official bus, groaning with comrades, came barreling up the road, followed by a long train of children, hollering in delirious joy. They had never before seen such a vehicle.

    Somini Sengupta is chief of the South Asia bureau of The New York Times.

    Copyright 2005 The New York Times Company Home Privacy Policy Search Corrections XML Help Contact Us Work for Us Site Map Back to Top

October 29, 2005

  • Washington Secrets Not What they Seem




    Christoph Bangert/Polaris for The New York Times

    Reporting on the Iraq war often means touching on classified material.


    October 23, 2005


    Correspondence

    The Washington Secret Often Isn't




    WASHINGTON — There are still lots of real secrets in Washington. But the most secretive White House in modern history has learned the hard way - even while its spokesman reflexively utter the caution, "We don't talk about intelligence," or, "Sorry, that's classified" - that it must reveal a pretty steady stream of secrets all the time.


    That is one reason journalists and some government officials are so wary of what might happen next in the C.I.A. leak case, which could conclude with indictments within a week. What began as a narrow case on a specific leak, many fear, has morphed into a broader threat to the way business is done here, a system that often benefits both sides.


    The investigation into the disclosure of the identity of a then covert C.I.A. operative, Valerie Wilson, might end with a broadly defined charge that boils down to divulging secret information, a category that covers not only real secrets, but the daily give and take between officials and journalists.


    Reporters worry about a chilling effect, one that would make it even harder to explain what the government is doing. Some government officials say they fear the impact because they know that it is often difficult these days to try to justify a national security decision, or warn of an impending threat, or even complain about some kinds of budget cuts without slipping into classified territory.


    In short, the law does not distinguish terribly well between real secrets and sort-of secrets, especially in an age when the instinct to stamp "classified" runs rampant.


    Few question that the name of a covert C.I.A. officer qualifies as an important secret: Disclosure can get people killed. But that case is the exception, rather than the rule. In five years of covering national security issues at the Bush White House, I've seen classified information leaked or suddenly declared "declassified" for many reasons, most often to explain a new policy and sometimes to back up a presidential statement.


    Just consider the past couple of weeks of White House reporting, which were pretty typical.


    My colleague James Risen unearthed a story about a firefight between American and Syrian forces along the Iraq border. Together, we began to explore its larger meaning: An internal White House debate over whether President Bush should formally allow the war to spill over the Syrian border, so that insurgents massing there could be stopped before attacking American troops in Iraq.


    The president's top foreign policy aides met to discuss this subject on Oct. 1, though officially the White House would not acknowledge that the meeting took place.


    But once they understood we were writing the article anyway, they felt compelled to talk, so that they would not appear to be stumbling into an expansion of the war. It was almost impossible to discuss the policy without wandering into events that were never made public and the debate over whether the president should issue a classified "finding" allowing action in Syria.


    Our more creative sources found a way to talk carefully, using coded phrases like "if such a meeting happened ..." or "if the President decided to. ..."


    Much the same happens when I press officials to explain the administration's options for beginning a withdrawal in Iraq next year. This means cutting past the president's oft-repeated statement that "as the Iraqis stand up, we can stand down." Similarly, you cannot intelligently discuss the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and Iran, or China's missile buildup, without trafficking in facts marked classified.


    So it is not uncommon for such facts to slip out, sometimes from officials seeking to wake up the administration or Congress to what they consider an under-appreciated threat. Plenty of strategic leaking goes on in the administration - especially if officials think they can conceal the sources of the information and make it public without putting someone's life in danger.


    Misjudgments happen. As soon as news organizations around the world reported several years ago that the United States was listening to Osama bin Laden's satellite phone conversations, he stopped making the calls, intelligence officials say. But such a clear-cut case is usually the exception.


    If there ever was a day in which classified material was kept in one well-locked drawer, completely separate from policy arguments and "open source material," it went out with the Pentagon Papers.


    There are moments when what is classified in the morning becomes public record in the afternoon. Two weeks ago, President Bush gave a speech defending his record fighting terrorism, saying the United States and its allies had stopped 10 terror plots, including three in the United States. He described none of them, and his spokesman, Scott McClellan, declined to provide details.


    BUT by late afternoon - after heated conversations between reporters and the White House, and then the White House and intelligence agencies - the White House e-mailed reporters a list of plots. It was a mix of cases that were well known and a few never before made public. A senior official who talked about them that night joked that a few hours earlier he might have been jailed for discussing the subject.


    "Now we've posted it on the White House Web site," he said.


    He might have said the same of a letter, apparently written by Ayman al-Zawahiri, a senior Qaeda leader, that was seized by American intelligence earlier this year. A few months ago, its existence was closely held. But the administration released it earlier this month to back up Mr. Bush's argument that Islamic extremists are seeking to create a caliphate from Spain to Indonesia.


    The administration declassified all kinds of intelligence about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction program so that Secretary of State Colin L. Powell could discuss it publicly in his famous Feb. 5, 2003, presentation to the United Nations. Unfortunately for him, almost every example he cited turned out to be wrong.


    Later in 2003, the White House resisted for weeks calls to declassify parts of the National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq that formed the basis for Mr. Powell's arguments, and those of Mr. Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney. Those estimates were once considered the crown jewels of the intelligence world. Eventually, the White House was forced to relent after the drip, drip, drip of accusations that the president had cherry-picked intelligence to justify the Iraq invasion. Once it became public, the estimate became Exhibit A in what had gone wrong inside the American intelligence community.


    The issue of secrecy won't go away. This week, a prosecutor may send a shot across Washington's bow: any indictment is bound to change the unspoken rules of authorized and unauthorized leaks, even if just for a while. But the week after, government officials will have to explain to allies, other nations and reporters why they are so worried that Iran may be building a bomb, and why they believe North Korea must permit inspections of every nook, cranny and cave in the country. And to do so, they may feel compelled to reach into their bag of secrets.





  • A Dream In Decline




    October 23, 2005


    For Blacks, a Dream in Decline




    THE Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. set forth the goal. Civil rights and union membership were to be intertwined. The labor movement, Dr. King wrote in 1958, "must concentrate its powerful forces on bringing economic emancipation to white and Negro by organizing them together in social equality."


    That happened in the 1960's and 1970's. But then unions lost bargaining power and members. And while labor leaders called attention to the overall decline, few took notice that blacks were losing much more ground than whites.


    In the last five years, that trend accelerated. Despite a growing economy, the number of African-Americans in unions has fallen by 14.4 percent since 2000, while white membership is down 5.4 percent.


    For a while in the 1980's, one out of every four black workers was a union member; now it is closer to one in seven. This loss of better-paying jobs helps to explain why blacks are doing worse than any other group in the current recovery. Labor leaders have acknowledged the disproportionate damage to African-Americans, but they decline to make special efforts to organize blacks and offset the decrease, saying that all groups need help. That lack of priority angers one prominent black scholar.


    "The future of black workers is very bleak indeed if they lose their place in the union movement," said William Julius Wilson, a professor of sociology and social policy at Harvard. "I would hope there would be an effort on the part of union leaders, white and black, to address this very important issue. They haven't done so as yet."


    The decline was particularly sharp last year. Overall union membership fell by 304,000, and blacks accounted for 55 percent of that drop, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reports, even though whites outnumber blacks six to one in unions (12.4 million to 2.1 million). The trend seems likely to continue and perhaps accelerate as General Motors and its principal parts supplier, Delphi, cut costs in their struggle to be profitable.


    "We have lost 20,000 members since the end of 2000 in Detroit and its suburbs alone," said Linda Ewing, director of research for the United Auto Workers, "and a large number of the workers in the auto and parts plants in this area are black."


    Unions, like other institutions in the post-World War II economy, were slow to admit African-Americans to the club, and there is still resistance today in some of the higher-paying skilled trades. Yet blacks came to rely on unions even more than working class whites did to gain entry into the middle class, through jobs that gave them annual wage increases and company-paid health insurance and pensions. Even now, the percentage of black workers who are in unions is slightly greater than the percentage of unionized white workers: 15.1 versus 12.2. "Every survey shows that blacks are the group that most wants to be unionized," said Richard Freeman, a Harvard labor economist.


    Immigration, retirement, automation, the shifting of work overseas, low seniority and privatization have all played a role in the lopsided decline of unionized jobs held by African-Americans. That decline is especially noticeable in manufacturing and the federal government, two strongholds of black employment that have gone through cutbacks in union workers in recent years.


    The cutbacks are particularly severe in the auto industry. In addition to the latest problems at G.M., Ford Motor said Thursday that it would soon announce "significant plant closings."


    The impact on blacks has gradually drawn the attention of labor leaders, including John J. Sweeney, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. "The percentage of black workers who have been knocked out of union jobs is one of the little-known tragedies of the last five years," he said.


    Despite this damage, the federation is not making a special effort to sign up more African-Americans in other industries, Mr. Sweeney said. "We are going to be organizing more blacks," he explained, "but we are also going to be organizing more Latinos and more women."


    Mr. Sweeney's reluctance to single out blacks has its counterpart in the breakaway union movement, Change to Win, which promises more aggressive organizing. Rather than focus on any particular group of workers, said Edgar Romney, secretary-treasurer of the new coalition, "we are targeting industries and communities in our organizing effort."


    Blue-collar workers earn high pay in manufacturing jobs, and the sharp decline in black union membership in that sector has helped to pull down the median weekly wage of all black workers, union and nonunion alike. Thus far this year, the median weekly wage earned by blacks fell by 5 percent, to $523, adjusted for inflation, according to an analysis of Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Whites as a group are also experiencing a drop in their median weekly wage, but for them the decline this year is less than 1 percent, to $677, adjusted for inflation.


    Some labor economists bridle at such comparisons. Robert Topel of the University of Chicago argues that for many years the wage gap between whites and blacks either shrank or remained stable, after adjusting for differences in education, experience and other factors. This occurred even as union power declined, he said.


    "If you ask me for a list of things that would be more important in understanding racial disparities and economic success, unionism would not be high on the list," Mr. Topel said. "Education, development of skills and family environment all play much bigger roles than collective bargaining power."


    The decline in black union membership is not simply the result of the erosion of employment in manufacturing. The Service Employees International Union, for example, represented for years large numbers of African-Americans employed in food service, janitorial work and nursing home care. Many were women. As they retired, Hispanics and Asians replaced them, in the jobs and as union members, said Patricia Ford, a former executive vice president of the S.E.I.U.


    "You can see the change from what was traditionally African-American to Hispanic," Ms. Ford said. "That is the most striking."


    Union membership among Hispanics, in fact, has risen gradually in this decade, to 1.7 million last year. That is partly a result of special efforts to organize Hispanics in service industries, Mr. Romney said.


    On another front, privatization and outsourcing have eaten away at federal employment of black workers represented by the American Federation of Government Employees, which says that nearly 25 percent of its 211,000 members are black.


    African-Americans make up an even higher percentage of the union's members at the operations that the Bush administration is turning over to private contractors. These include laundries at veterans' hospitals, ground maintenance and food service at government installations and security guards at numerous federal buildings - much of it work that paid only $15,000 to $20,000 a year, but that came with pensions and health insurance.


    The union's leaders resist viewing what is happening in racial terms. "We see it as a class issue rather than a race issue," said Sharon Pinnock, the A.F.G.E.'s director for membership and organization. "It is impacting all workers, black and white."


    Automation at the Postal Service, mainly in the form of sorting machines that require many fewer workers, has cut into the ranks of the National Association of Letter Carriers and the American Postal Workers Union, both with high percentages of blacks among their members.


    And then there is the tendency of many corporations to move operations to suburbs from downtown locations. In the process, unionized African-American workers are often replaced by nonunion workers, in many cases white.


    The Communications Workers of America makes that complaint, citing customer service call center operations as one example. "They gradually move to the suburbs, eliminating African-American union members in the city," said George Kohl, the union's senior director of collective bargaining.


    Mr. Sweeney said such stories anger him. "We have learned a lot from the civil rights movement; it is important that we highlight the most egregious offenses," he said. "But we have to focus on all the workers who are getting hurt."





  • Donald Trump




    October 23, 2005


    What's He Really Worth?




    For decades, Donald Trump, America's most effervescent rich guy, has made his wealth a matter of public discourse. But sometimes his riches are hard to find. This article was adapted from "TrumpNation: The Art of Being the Donald," by Timothy L. O'Brien, a reporter for The New York Times. The book, to be published on Wednesday by Warner Books, looks inside Mr. Trump's wallet.


    BY 1993, with his casinos in hock, most of his real estate holdings either forfeited or stagnant and his father slipping into the fog of Alzheimer's disease, Donald Trump, at the age of 47, had run out of money. There were no funds left to keep him aloft, and as the bare-bones operation he maintained in Manhattan started to grind to a halt, he ordered Nick Ribis, the Trump Organization's president, to call his siblings and ask for a handout from their trusts. Donald needed about $10 million for his living and office expenses, but he had no collateral to provide his brother and sisters, all three of whom wanted a guarantee that he would repay them.


    The Trump children's anticipated share of their father's fortune amounted to about $35 million each, and Donald's siblings demanded that he sign a promissory note pledging future distributions from his trust fund against the $10 million he wanted to borrow.


    Donald got his loan, but about a year later he was almost broke again. When he went to the trough the second time, he asked his siblings for $20 million more. His brother Robert Trump, who briefly oversaw Donald's casinos before fleeing the pressure of working for him to take over their father's real estate operation, balked. Desperate to scrape some money together, Donald tasked Alan Marcus, one of his advisers, to contact his brother-in-law John Barry and see if he could intervene with Robert and his other siblings.


    "John and I spoke about it a few times," Mr. Marcus told me. "In fact, we spoke about it in the conference room in Trump Tower. John then went around and addressed it with the family."


    Mr. Marcus said that Mr. Barry successfully lobbied other members of the Trump clan and that another handout was arranged, with Donald agreeing again that whatever he failed to pay back would be taken out of his share of their father's estate.


    "We would have literally closed down," said another former member of the Trump Organization familiar with Donald's efforts to keep the company afloat. "The key would have been in the door and there would have been no more Donald Trump. The family saved him."


    Donald disagreed with this version of events. "I had zero borrowings from the estate," he told me. "I give you my word." Donald's brother, Robert, did not respond to repeated interview requests. Mr. Barry is deceased. His widow, Maryanne Trump Barry, a federal judge, said that she could not recollect any efforts to offer her brother financial help. Donald's other sister, Elizabeth, was unavailable for comment.


    But Mr. Marcus and two other executives who worked closely with Donald all said the family's financial lifeline gave the developer the support he needed to get through the rough waters separating his early years of overblown, overhyped acquisitions and the later years of small, sedate deals preceding his resurrection on "The Apprentice." Both of Donald's parents died during that time, he parried with Ivana Trump in a bitter divorce battle that hinged on properly valuing his dwindling assets, he remarried and divorced again, and then he did what anyone else in his situation would do when confronted with limited options: he ran for president of the United States.


    Before Donald could get to Phase 2 of his career, he had to muscle his way through the dismantling of his business empire and a thorny financial restructuring with his bankers and bond holders that left him on the precipice of personal and corporate bankruptcy. As bankers who once fell over one another to throw money at him now lined up for their share of what was left over, Donald scrambled to hang on to whatever he could while maintaining his facade as America's most savvy entrepreneur. And in terms of maintaining his popular mojo, Donald proved remarkably resilient.


    "When I was in trouble in the early 90's, I went around and - you know, a lot of people couldn't believe I did this because they think I have an ego - I went around and openly told people I was worth minus $900 million," Donald recalled. "And then I was able to make a deal with the banks."


    To survive a process as tortuous and unpredictable as a debt workout, however, requires a large dose of gumption. Donald had gumption in spades.


    "You're out there alone. I mean, it's not fun," he advised me. "I went from being a boy wonder, boy genius, to this [expletive] guy who has nothing but problems."


    Although Donald's brush with bankruptcy separated him from some of his showiest assets and from the banks whose loans had first puffed him up, his penchant for claiming billionairedom remains. To this day, he closely monitors his ranking on Forbes magazine's annual list of America's wealthiest individuals, the Forbes 400, and his ability to float above the wreckage of his financial miscues and to magically add zeroes to his bank account has ensured that he remains an object of fascination. But how much is Donald Trump really worth?


    IN September 1982, with Trump Tower a year away from completion, Forbes published the Forbes 400 for the first time. (In 1918, Forbes produced a list of America's 30 richest people, but that was a one-time event.) Chock-full of anecdotes about how the rich became rich and what they did with their richly deserved riches, the Forbes 400 was financial pornography of the most voyeuristic and delicious sort.


    While there was a refreshing inclusiveness about the list (Mafia treasurer Meyer Lansky made the inaugural tally, for example), some on the roster held rank upon the loosest of foundations. For those whose wealth was based on a stake in a publicly traded company, calculating their Forbes worthiness was relatively straightforward: put a value on their stock. But for those with privately held money who weren't a Rockefeller, Mellon, du Pont or Kennedy, the process of ascertaining fortunes was trickier. Forbes relied on those people to willingly fork over an honest and somewhat exact self-appraisal of their wealth.


    It also turned out that some big buckaroos, understandably averse to receiving an avalanche of phone calls from charities or scamsters that would follow such publicity, loathed being on the list. Nonetheless, the Forbes 400 drew scads of attention from the moment it was published. The list became capitalism's Rosetta stone, a decoding device for divining the American Way. Even prominent economists parsed it for social truths.


    "At a trivial level, it is almost impossible not to be interested in Forbes magazine's annual list of the 400 wealthiest individuals, minimum net worth $150 million, and 82 wealthiest families, minimum net worth $200 million," wrote Lester Thurow, an M.I.T. economist, in 1984. "Subconsciously, we read their biographies hoping to find the elixir that will add us to the list. While the elixir - a rich father - is to be found (all of the 82 families and 241 of the 400 wealthiest individuals inherited all or a major part of their fortunes), it doesn't help most of us to point this out to our fathers."


    Professor Thurow added: "Great wealth is accumulated to acquire economic power. Wealth makes you an economic mover and shaker. Projects will happen, or not happen, depending upon your decisions. It allows you to influence the political process - elect yourself or others - and remold society in accordance with your views. It makes you an important person, courted by people inside and outside your family. Perhaps this explains why some people try to persuade Forbes that they are wealthy enough to merit inclusion."


    This, then, was the dividing line: Those who were secure enough not to reveal their wealth abhorred the Forbes 400, or at least tried to avoid it; those who were less secure, needed to keep score and had their identities wrapped up in the concept of billionairedom turned the list into a white-collar fetish. For the latter group, to be off the Forbes 400 represented emotional and social exile.


    Donald, paradoxically, was a loner who did not want to live in exile. He was obsessed with the Forbes list. And his propensity for inflation, matched with Forbes's aversion to hiring the sizable staff it might need to assess accurately the wealth of each of its designated 400, got Donald on the magazine's inaugural list in 1982. Forbes gave him an undefined share of a family fortune that the magazine estimated at $200 million - at a time when all Donald owned personally was a half-interest in the Grand Hyatt hotel and a share of the yet-to-be-completed Trump Tower.


    Donald and the Forbes 400 were mutually reinforcing. The more Donald's verbal fortune rose, the more often he received prominent mentions in Forbes. The more often Forbes mentioned him, the more credible Donald's claim to vast wealth became. The more credible his claim to vast wealth became, the easier it was for him to get on the Forbes 400 - which became the standard that others in the news media, and apparently some of the country's biggest banks, used when judging Donald's riches.


    IN some years, Donald insisted on impossibly high figures for his net worth and then, in a faux fit of complaining, settled for an estimate that Forbes convinced itself was conservative - even though it was often wildly high anyway. The one gap in this mating dance was 1990 to 1995, when Donald didn't appear on the list at all. Forbes was apparently so chastened by the $2.6 billion difference in its estimate of Donald's wealth between 1989 and 1990 that the magazine needed a six-year hiatus before it had the confidence to begin helping him inflate his verbal fortune again.


    Forbes's odes to Donald and his father, Fred Trump, went like this over the years:


    1982 Wealth: Share of Fred's estimated $200 million fortune. Forbes explains: "Consummate self-promoter. Building Trump Tower next to Tiffany's. Angling for Atlantic City casino." Forbes quotes Donald: " 'Man is the most vicious of animals and life is a series of battles ending in victory or defeat.' " While Forbes estimates that the family's fortune was over $200 million, it says that "Donald claims $500 million."


    1983 Wealth: Share of Fred's estimated $400 million fortune. (Author note: Observe that although 1982 to 1983 was a particularly brutal recession year, the Trump family's real estate fortune doubles.)


    1984 Wealth: Fred has $200 million; Donald has $400 million.


    1985 Rank: 51; Wealth: $600 million. (Donald becomes a solo Forbes 400 act; Fred disappears from the list.)


    1986 Rank: 50; $700 million.


    1987 Rank: 63; $850 million.


    1988 Rank: 44; $1 billion.


    1989 Rank: 26; $1.7 billion. (Observe that Donald's wealth has grown by $1.1 billion during a four-year period when he was borrowing huge sums to buy money-losing properties.)


    1990 Dropped from the list! Forbes explains: "In 1990 the rich have been getting poorer. Trump is the most noteworthy loser. Once a billionaire, Trump's net worth may actually have dropped to zero." (That makes things clearer. Was he ever a billionaire? Maybe his net worth just stayed the same? Maybe it always had been zero?)


    1991 AWOL.


    1992 AWOL.


    1993 AWOL. (These are the times that try men's souls. Hang in there, Donald.)


    1994 AWOL.


    1995 AWOL.


    1996 He's back. Rank: 373; $450 million. Forbes explains: "Trump, polite but unhappy, phoning from his plane: 'You're putting me on at $450 million? I've got that much in stock market assets alone. There's 100 percent of Trump Tower, 100 percent of the new Nike store - they're paying $10 million a year in rent!' Add it all up, said Trump, and his net worth is 'in the $2 billion range, probably over $2 billion.' " (Don't worry, Donald. One year from now Forbes will help you find another easy $1 billion.)


    1997 Rank: 105; $1.4 billion. Forbes explains: "Net worth was negative $900 million in 1990, but the Donald now claims to have $500 million in cash alone. Disputes our estimate. 'The real number,' he insists, 'is $3.7 billion.' "


    1998 Rank: 121; $1.5 billion. Forbes explains: "Unstoppable salesman, master of hyperbole. Net worth was negative $900 million in 1990, now claims our estimate is low by a factor of three: 'The number is closer to $5 billion.' "


    1999 Rank: 145; $1.6 billion. Forbes explains: "We love Donald. He returns our calls. He usually pays for lunch. He even estimates his own net worth ($4.5 billion). But no matter how hard we try, we just can't prove it."


    2000 Rank: 167; $1.7 billion. Forbes explains: "In the Donald's world, worth more than $5 billion. Back on earth, worth considerably less."


    2001 Rank: 110; $1.8 billion.


    2002 Rank: 92; $1.9 billion.


    2003 Rank: 71; $2.5 billion.


    2004 Rank: 189; $2.6 billion. Forbes explains: "America's love affair with the Donald reaching impossibly new highs; his reality show, 'The Apprentice,' was prime-time television's highest-rated series last year ... After nearly defaulting on its debt obligations, Trump's gaming properties to reorganize ... No matter. For Donald, real estate is where his real wealth lies. Over 18 million square feet of prime Manhattan space."


    Forbes, if not entirely skeptical of Donald, had, of course, grown accustomed to his intense lobbying. "There are a couple of guys who call and say you're low on other guys," said Peter Newcomb, a veteran editor of Forbes's rich list, "but Trump is one of the most glaring examples of someone who constantly calls about himself and says we're not only low, but low by a multiple." Mr. Newcomb said that Forbes works hard to ensure the accuracy of its data but that it also relies on information provided by those whom it surveys.


    The Forbes 400, of course, has always loomed large in Donald's imagination.


    "When you think of it, I've been on that list for a long time. I think they work very hard at the list," he told me. "It seems to be that they're the barometer of individual wealth. It doesn't really matter. It matters much less to me today than it mattered in the past. In the past, it probably mattered more."


    Donald's verbal billions were always a topic of conversation whenever we visited. In my first conversation with him, in 1996, he brought up his billions. When Donald and I spent time together one weekend in Palm Beach, Fla., earlier this year, the subject inevitably came up. Donald had gamely and openly fielded a diverse range of questions all day, so I was curious to see where he would go when we got to money. When I popped the wealth question, he paused momentarily and scrunched his eyebrows. We had reached a crossroads. Out it came. He pursed his lips a little bit. Out it came. He blinked. Out it came, rising up from deep within him.


    "I would say six [billion]. Five to six. Five to six," he said.


    Hmm. The previous August he told me that his net worth was $4 billion to $5 billion. Then, later that same day that August, he said his casino holdings represented 2 percent of his wealth, which at the time gave him a net worth of about $1.7 billion. In the same day, Donald's own estimates of his wealth differed by as much as $3.3 billion. How could that happen? Was Donald living in his own private zone of wildly escalating daily inflation, a Trump Bolivia? And his $1.7 billion figure in August was well below the $2.6 billion that Forbes would credit him when it published its rich list just a couple of months later.


    Now Donald was saying he was worth $5 billion to $6 billion.


    "Five to six. Five to six."


    And on the nightstand in my bedroom at Donald's Palm Beach club, Mar-a-Lago, was a glossy brochure that said he was worth $9.5 billion.


    WHEN I sat down in a Trump Tower conference room one afternoon earlier this year with Allen Weisselberg, the Trump Organization's chief financial officer, he claimed that Donald was worth about $6 billion. But the list of assets that Mr. Weisselberg quoted, all of which were valued in very inflated and optimistic terms and some of which Donald didn't own, totaled only about $5 billion. Where might the rest have been? "I'm going to go to my office and find that other billion," Mr. Weisselberg assured me.


    Did he ever return? No, he never returned. His assessment of Donald's wealth is outlined in the accompanying chart.


    But Mr. Weisselberg's analysis left me confused. So I asked around for guidance.


    Three people with direct knowledge of Donald's finances, people who had worked closely with him for years, told me that they thought his net worth was somewhere between $150 million and $250 million. (Donald's casino holdings have recently rebounded in value, perhaps adding as much as $135 million to these estimates.) By anyone's standards, this still qualified Donald as comfortably wealthy, but none of these people thought that he was remotely close to being a billionaire.


    Donald dismissed this as naysaying.


    "You can go ahead and speak to guys who have 400-pound wives at home who are jealous of me, but the guys who really know me know I'm a great builder," he told me.


    However illusory, it was Donald's fixation on billionaire bragging rights and real estate prowess - in addition to the financial lifeline his siblings tossed to him - that kept his mojo rising during his brush with financial extinction in the early to mid-1990's. But the Donald who emerged on the other side of his business meltdown was a financial shadow of his earlier, acquisitive, debt-laden self, and would remain so right up to the debut of "The Apprentice."


    Financial turmoil, of course, didn't stop Donald from spouting. The all-time howler award for a publication taking his verbal billions at face value belonged to Playboy. In early 1990, just a month before the Taj Mahal opened in Atlantic City and began a financial slide that would take Donald's empire down with it, the magazine profiled the developer and said he had amassed "a fortune his father never dreamed possible," including "a cash hoard of $900 million" and a "geyser of $50 million a week from his hotel-casinos."


    In the real world, New Jersey casino auditors estimated in public reports that as of September 1990, Donald was worth about $206 million - almost all of which was tied up in hotels, an airline, casinos and other properties that were devaluing rapidly or about to be taken away from him. Donald's cash on hand was only $17 million, and that was dissolving quickly as well.


    Regulators projected Donald's 1991 income from trusts and rentals at $1.7 million, offset by $9.7 million in debt payments, $6 million in personal business expenses and $4.5 million to maintain his Trump Tower triplex and estates in Greenwich, Conn., and Palm Beach for the year - meaning that he would be about $18.5 million in the hole at the end of 1991. Regulators projected Donald's income for 1992 to sink to $748,000 and his 1993 income to drop even further, to $296,000 - with all of his debt payments and personal expenses continuing to pile up. At the end of 1993, his personal cash shortfall would amount to about $39 million and there would still be $900 million in personally guaranteed loans hanging over his head.


    In the midst of all of this, Donald reached a property settlement with Ivana Trump after their divorce. According to a 1991 New Jersey regulatory report, the settlement called for Ms. Trump to get a $10 million payment, the couple's Greenwich estate, $350,000 in annual alimony, $300,000 in annual child support, a $4 million housing allowance, use of some Trump properties and a $350,000 salary for running the Plaza Hotel. Donald didn't have the $10 million to pay his ex-wife; he ended up using part of the $65 million that banks had loaned his business the prior year to pay her, according to regulators who said in their report that the payment to Ms. Trump "depleted most of Mr. Trump's personal cash."


    Throughout early 1991 and into the summer, Donald helped his banks begin to dismantle his holdings so he could pay off $3.4 billion in business debt and release himself from the $900 million in personal arrears attached to that pile. Absent an overhaul, Donald would be wiped out.


    The little ray of sunshine in all of this for Donald was that the real estate collapse sweeping the country in the early 1990's left banks with wads of bad loans in their coffers. They could choose to put their borrowers out of business and be left owning companies they didn't want to run, or force debtors into messy bankruptcy proceedings that would involve paying whopping legal fees and suffering through years of delays. Neither alternative appealed to the banks.


    "That was sort of the bottom of the heap. Deep trouble. They could have really done a big number. There was a personal guarantee on the loan," Donald told me. "My father was a pro. My father knew, like I knew, you don't personally guarantee. So I wrote a book called 'The Art of the Deal,' which as you know is the biggest of all time. In the book, I say, 'Never personally guarantee.' "


    But, Donald added, "I've told people I didn't follow my own advice."


    Donald's enthusiasm for the Forbes 400 also waned during his flirtation with bankruptcy. In his sequel to "The Art of the Deal," a book called "Trump: Surviving at the Top," he offered a new take on his view of a rich list to which he no longer belonged.


    "It always amazed me that people pay so much attention to Forbes magazine," wrote Donald, who always paid a lot of attention to Forbes magazine. "Every year the Forbes 400 comes out, and people talk about it as if it were a rigorously researched compilation of America's wealthiest people, instead of what it really is: a sloppy, highly arbitrary estimate of certain people's net worth."


    DONALD managed to weather the slings and arrows of doubters during these lean years and hunkered down with his bankers and with his debts. As the negotiations progressed, Donald's bankers looked for every alternative they could find to bankruptcy, because none of the banks wanted to contend with the mess that would ensue if the talks collapsed. And the Trumpster kept singing a happy tune. "He was always upbeat," recalled Harvey Miller, a lawyer representing Citibank. "One thing I'll say about Donald, he was never depressed."


    Unbeknownst to his creditors, Donald was just as worried about a bankruptcy as they were. He later told me that he wanted to avoid bankruptcy at all costs because he felt that it would permanently taint him as a failure or a quitter.


    Sanford Morhouse, a lawyer representing Chase Manhattan bank in the Trump negotiations, said: "I did a lot of workouts in those days on behalf of Chase, with a lot of real estate developers who had similar problems, and big ones. Almost all of them, at one point or another in that era, filed for bankruptcy protection. And Donald, to his credit, did not."


    Donald whittled down his mammoth personal debts by forfeiting most of what he owned. Chase Manhattan, which lent Donald the money he needed to buy the West Side yards, his biggest Manhattan parcel, forced a sale of the prized tract to Asian developers. Though Donald would claim after the yards were sold that he remained a principal owner of the site, property records did not list him as such.


    According to former members of the Trump Organization, Donald did not retain any ownership of the site's real estate - the owners merely promised to give him about 30 percent of the profits once the site was completely developed or sold. Until that time, the owners kept Donald on to do what he did best: build. They gave him a modest construction fee and a management fee to oversee the development. They also allowed him to slap his name on the buildings that eventually rose on the yards because his well-known moniker allowed them to charge a premium for their condos.


    Retained for his building expertise and his marquee value, Donald was a glorified landlord on the site; he no longer controlled it. (Earlier this year, the owners negotiated to sell the site without consulting Donald; terms of the prospective sale are in dispute.)


    EVEN as the national real estate bubble was bursting, fresh funds began rushing onto Wall Street, fueling a historic run-up in both the stock market and initial public offerings of often barely viable companies. If you had a good story and a prominent name, it suddenly became quite easy to sell stock. And it turned out, against all odds, that investors were willing to gamble on Donald's name - even though they were getting a chief executive whose sense of his responsibilities as the steward of a publicly traded company and the guardian of other people's money was somewhat ill defined.


    "Something gnawed at me, and I knew what it was - the whole head-of-a-public-company routine," Donald wrote in "Surviving," relating his previous experience as a manager of Resorts International. "Although I certainly agreed with the theory of stockholder-owned corporations and was absolutely committed to fulfilling my fiduciary duties, I personally didn't like answering to a board of directors."


    In a tribute to the sucker-born-every-minute theorem, Donald managed to take two of the Trump casinos public in 1995 and 1996, at a time when he was unable to make his bank payments and was heading toward personal bankruptcy. The stock sales allowed Donald to buy the casinos back from the banks and to unload huge amounts of debt. The offering also yanked Donald out of the financial graveyard and left him with a 25 percent stake in a company he once owned entirely. Trump Hotels and Casino Resorts traded at $14 a share initially and, along with a fresh bond offering, the new company raised about $295 million.


    Exactly what investors thought they might get for their Trump Hotels investment wasn't entirely clear. Donald had already demonstrated that casinos weren't his forte, and investors were buying stock in a company that was immediately larded with debts that made it difficult, if not impossible, to upgrade the operations. Even so, Trump Hotels' shares rose to about $36 in 1996, giving Donald a stake worth about $290 million. With little real estate left to speak of in Manhattan, Donald's wealth was centered on his casinos.


    But in subsequent years Trump Hotels' stock price tanked. Had Donald tried to pare down some $1.8 billion in debt smothering the casino company and spruced up the operation, he might have ridden a reignited gambling boom and grown his newly seeded fortune. Instead, Trump Hotels, which never earned a profit in any year between 1995 and 2005, became Donald's private stockpile of ready cash. In 1996 alone, Trump Hotels' shares fell to $12 from $35.50. About a decade later, the New York Stock Exchange delisted the shares entirely and any kid with a quarter could buy the stock. (Trump Hotels recently reorganized as Trump Entertainment Resorts; it now carries $1.2 billion in debt, and Donald's stake in the company is worth about $135 million.)


    When I interviewed Donald in 1996, he was effusive about his casinos and somehow seemed to forget that he owned relatively little Manhattan property at the time.


    "Donald Trump is in two businesses," he told me. "I have this huge company that's real estate. I also have this huge company that's gambling. So I have two huge companies."


    Donald continued to carve out a niche for himself in New York real estate as the manager of other people's properties. In 1994, General Electric was looking for someone to refurbish the old Gulf & Western building on Columbus Circle in Manhattan, and retained Donald. Presto, the renovated skyscraper was christened Trump International Hotel and Tower. Even though Donald didn't own the building, it later flashed across the opening credits of "The Apprentice" as if he did.


    And Donald did scramble back to gain control of some other Manhattan buildings, including 40 Wall Street, which he spent about $35 million to buy and refurbish in 1996. The building has about $145 million in debt attached to it, and New York City tax assessors currently value the property at about $90 million. Donald values it at $400 million.


    Donald's recent golf course ventures have produced some sterling new properties, but the values he assigns those deals appear to be hyper-inflated. Donald's Palm Beach course, for example, has about 285 members who paid $250,000 for memberships, for a total of $71.25 million. Donald borrowed about $47 million to build the course and a new clubhouse. So he banked about $24 million on the deal, before other costs. He leases the land beneath the course from Palm Beach County; he doesn't own it. But Donald carries the course on his books as an asset worth $200 million.


    Forbes, in bestowing a $2.6 billion fortune on Donald in its 2004 rich list, credited him with owning 18 million square feet of Manhattan property, which certainly is an impossibility. On one occasion, Donald told me that the West Side yards, which he doesn't own, would have 10 million square feet of salable space when the site, now known as Riverside South, was completed. (Mr. Weisselberg told me, alternatively, that the site would have about five million square feet of salable space.) However measured, the yards were by far the biggest property in Donald's former Manhattan real estate portfolio - but he no longer owned the tract.


    Between 2000 and 2004, Forbes allowed Donald's verbal billions to grow by $1 billion. The jump came during a period when the stock market bubble burst, Donald's stake in his casinos - one of his most valuable assets until "The Apprentice" came along - had fallen in value to $7 million and, despite Manhattan's red-hot real estate market, he owned much less real estate there than he let on.


    Donald said his casinos' myriad problems - no profits, suffocating debt, disappearing cash - did not mean that he had failed in Atlantic City. Instead, he described his management of the casinos as an "entrepreneurial" success, defining "entrepreneurial" as his ability to take cash out of the casino company and use it for other things.


    "Entrepreneurially, not as a person who drives up stock, but as a private person, it's been a very good deal," he told me. "If I would have worked Atlantic City the way I worked real estate, I would probably be the biggest casino company in the world rather than just a nice company, et cetera, et cetera."


    Two weeks ago, Forbes published its 2005 list of America's wealthiest people. Donald held 83rd place with what Forbes described as a $2.7 billion fortune. "My net worth has tripled," Donald told the magazine.










  • Medical Issues




    The New York Times



    October 30, 2005


    Being a Patient

    For a Retainer, Lavish Care by 'Boutique Doctors'




    BOCA RATON, Fla. - It was on the plane from Shanghai to Beijing last year that Dorothy Lipson of Delray Beach, Fla., suddenly began to cough up blood: first in streaks, then in frightening, tissue-soaking spoonfuls.


    But Mrs. Lipson, who was in China visiting an expatriate daughter, was lucky on two counts. First, her daughter happens to run a corporation that builds gleaming Western-style hospitals in China; Ms. Lipson was rushed to the Beijing hospital on landing. And second, Mrs. Lipson's internist back home in Florida is Dr. Bernard Kaminetsky, one of a new breed of "concierge" or "boutique" doctors who, in exchange for a yearly cash retainer, lavish time, phone calls and attention on patients, using the latest in electronic communications to streamline their care.


    Since its debut in 1996, concierge medicine has evoked criticism from many corners. Some ethicists say it is exacerbating the inequities in American health care. Insurance regulators have raised concerns about fraud. Government watchdogs, worried that it threatens the tenuous equilibrium of the health care system, are keeping an eye on trends.


    "Concierge care is like a new country club for the rich," Representative Pete Stark, Democrat of California, said at a joint economic committee hearing in Congress last year. "The danger is that if a large number of doctors choose to open up these types of practices, the health care system will become even more inequitable than it is today."


    But for Mrs. Lipson, who pays $1,650 a year, the niceties enabled by concierge medicine can make all the difference.


    Dr. Kaminetsky was in daily touch with her doctors in Beijing. E-mail messages, X-ray reports and digitalized images flew back and forth. When the bleeding was stabilized and Mrs. Lipson returned home, Dr. Kaminetsky immediately connected her with a local specialist for a biopsy of her diseased lungs, and then with infectious disease experts for treatment of the unusual infection that was found.


    Mrs. Lipson's long convalescence was seamless, with none of the snags that can magnify the misery of serious illness: no long hours in strange waiting rooms, no lost X-ray or culture reports, no contradictory pronouncements by specialists confused by missing information. Dr. Kaminetsky's office coordinated all her appointments, tests and treatments. He personally telephoned her with all results and saw her as often as necessary to make sure everything went smoothly.


    Now, still on medication over 18 months later, Mrs. Lipson applauds her foresight in signing up for this deluxe model of medical care. The yearly expense, she points out, is far smaller than more traditional luxuries like cruises or late-model cars. "I highly recommend it," she said. "It's well worth the money."


    More Money, More Attention


    Anyone searching the country for a group of patients who are perfectly happy with their medical care, neither brutalized by the system nor fearful that the onset of a serious illness will plunge them into a morass of confusion and neglect, need look no farther than Dr. Kaminetsky's waiting room here in Boca Raton.


    Not that the waiting room usually has anyone in it. One promise made to patients paying for concierge service is that waiting will not be a part of their health care experience. Patients are guaranteed that phone calls will be returned promptly, appointments will be scheduled on a same-day basis if necessary, and appointment times will be honored. A bowl of fruit salad and platters of bagels and sponge cake set out for patients in the waiting room can go barely touched over the course of a day, and the television often plays to an empty couch.


    A relatively simple tradeoff is responsible: the extra fees collected from patients let concierge doctors, who leave regular practice for concierge medicine, slash their caseloads. Before Dr. Kaminetsky became a concierge doctor five years ago he had 2,500 patients in his practice - a standard number for most primary care internists. His list now numbers 600.


    Sick and well alike, patients are delighted with the results.


    Joan Holzman, 69, takes no medicines and has no health problems; she comes to the office once a year for a physical exam, an X-ray, an electrocardiogram and blood tests. "I adore it," Ms. Holzman said. "Before, wherever you went you felt like cattle. But everyone here is top-notch - the doctors, the secretaries, the nurses. They're warm, like family. It's a wonderful feeling of security."


    Phoebe Kupps, 81, made a same-day appointment with Dr. Kaminetsky recently to discuss a scribbled list of minor problems, including her insomnia, her sinus congestion and an unpleasant sour taste in her mouth. For a half-hour (uninterrupted by ringing phones or any other distractions) she and Dr. Kaminetsky methodically reviewed her medications and considered ways to get rid of the bad taste and improve her sleep, including avoiding afternoon naps and alcoholic nightcaps, and turning the bedroom clock to the wall.


    "It's like having insurance and not using it," Mrs. Kupps said. "I've been a well person. These little things are ridiculous. But here I can get them dealt with right away, they don't build up. I've heard stories from my friends, when they get ill, they can't get in to see their doctor for weeks."


    Herbert Glickman, 75, has seen more than a dozen specialists since both of his knees were replaced in 2003, trying to find the cause of his persistent knee pain. He periodically drops off wads of consultation and test reports to add to his bulging file at Dr. Kaminetsky's office, and during long phone calls and appointments the two sort through the results.


    When a month went by recently without a word from Mr. Glickman, Dr. Kaminetsky called him at home. "He was calling to find out how I was," Mr. Glickman said in the tone of one discussing a miracle. "I never heard that from any doctor!"


    Dr. Kaminetsky's practice is affiliated with a corporation called MDVIP, which he helped found. It processes the retainer fees, oversees the office's electronic capabilities and runs quality control to make sure the clerical staff members are courteous and make appointments with the promised alacrity. Nationwide about 250 medical practices and 100,000 patients have signed up with MDVIP and similar corporations, according to the professional society of concierge physicians, the Society for Innovative Medical Practice Design, founded in 2003.


    These doctors charge fees as high as $10,000 a year, depending on the services promised. The majority charge $1,500 to $2,000. Basic services consist of same-day or next-day appointments and 24-hour telephone access to the doctor. The most expensive may also promise the doctor will make home visits, deliver medications and accompany patients on visits to other doctors.


    In Dr. Kaminetsky's practice of three doctors all the patients are concierge patients. Retired patients are sometimes enrolled by their children, who may also cover the retainer fees. About 10 percent of the patients are seen free of charge, "scholarship patients" who the doctors have decided are in real need of the extra services and whose yearly retainer fees are waived. Because the practice has a 96 percent annual retention rate, its waiting list of several hundred names moves up slowly.


    "We turn people away every day," Dr. Kaminetsky said.


    All About Numbers


    Despite the drastic decrease in patient load after he changed the way he ran his practice, Dr. Kaminetsky's personal compensation and the salaries of his office staff members increased by about 60 percent.


    The arithmetic behind this seeming contradiction results from the low per-visit reimbursement rates set by Medicare for primary care office practices. Medicare now pays an internist like Dr. Kaminetsky slightly over $50 for an average office visit. Thus, a regular internist might earn about $200 a year from Medicare for caring for the average older patient with high blood pressure or elevated cholesterol but no other major health problems.


    Other medical insurers follow Medicare fees closely, which is why office-based primary care doctors who accept insurance say they must see dozens of patients a day just to break even.


    A concierge doctor charging the $1,650 MDVIP fee, though, makes at least $1,150 a year per patient (MDVIP retains $500 for its services). This huge increase in per-patient reimbursement allows the patient loads to be kept low.


    Primary care doctors also occasionally lower their patient loads by participating in only a few insurance plans, or, sometimes, in none at all. No one knows how many of these partly or completely "fee-for-service" practices operate in this country, or whether their number is increasing.


    For office visits, these doctors set their own cash fees, which can be hundreds of dollars a visit, rivaling concierge medicine in out-of-pocket expense for the patient. Unlike concierge doctors, though, fee-for-service doctors do not enter into a formal legal contract with patients that enumerates the services patients will receive for the money.


    Some concierge practices operate exclusively on a cash basis. Others - generally those with lower annual fees, like Dr. Kaminetsky's - still participate in Medicare or other insurance plans.


    These practices have reached an uneasy truce with insurers. Insurers forbid double billing for visits they cover, so the yearly concierge fees are specifically allocated for services that insurers do not cover, like annual physical exams and health reviews, preventive services like nutritional counseling and frills like a wallet-size CD containing an up-to-date medical history and test results for patients to carry with them.


    Even so, critics maintain that concierge services violate the spirit, if not the letter, of federal Medicare law, which aspires to regulate doctors' fees to a uniform standard and streamline access to medical care for the old and infirm.


    After five senators wrote a letter of complaint to the Department of Health and Human Services in 2002, a formal examination was begun. Tommy G. Thompson, who headed the department at that time, concluded that as long as the retainer fee was clearly for services not covered by Medicare, collecting the fees did not violate the law.


    Subsequently, the Government Accountability Office examined trends in concierge medicine and concluded, in a report in August 2005, that the number of concierge physicians nationwide was still too small for the practice to limit Medicare patients' access to health care, but that the government would continue to monitor trends.


    Some argue that concierge services actually save health care dollars. In Florida, for instance, internal MDVIP statistics indicate that concierge patients receive screening exams like mammograms and Pap smears more regularly than those with commercial insurance, and they require fewer hospital admissions, said Darin Engelhardt, the company's chief financial officer.


    "As far as I'm concerned, we're saving Medicare money," Dr. Kaminetsky said.


    He pointed to cases like that of Philip Novack, 94. For Mr. Novack, who is in fragile health, Dr. Kaminetsky's office often becomes a low-stress alternative to the emergency room. One morning last summer, Mr. Novack woke up at 5 a.m. feeling unwell and asked his wife, Edythe Shane-Novack, to call an ambulance. A veteran of many similar emergencies, she waited till 9:02 a.m. and called Dr. Kaminetsky's office instead.


    Less than three hours later Mr. Novack was perched on an examining table, smiling at the familiar faces in the office and receiving the same evaluation he would have had in the emergency room, including blood tests, an X-ray and a cardiogram.


    The diagnosis, a slight imbalance in his blood sodium level, was made promptly, and Mr. Novack was better by the next morning. Instead of paying expensive emergency fees, Medicare would pay only for an office visit. "This is the best thing that ever happened to us," Mrs. Shane-Novack said.


    Perceptions


    Charges that concierge practices violate not financial ethics, but professional ethics, also abound.


    "Philosophically, I think it's appalling," said David Barton Smith, professor of health services administration at Temple University in Philadelphia. "It's creating a two-class system of medicine."


    Critics have accused doctors who make the transition to a concierge practice from a regular one of abandoning patients who cannot afford to join up. Concierge doctors counter that when they convert their practices they do so over a transition period of several months, and always provide referrals to alternate sources of care, as mandated by the American Medical Association's code of ethics.


    Other critics feel that concierge medicine hurts the profession's image. "The public is already mistrustful of doctors' self interests," Dr. Jay Jacobson, a medical ethicist in Salt Lake City, wrote in 2002. "Boutique practices exacerbate the distrust."


    Others feel that concierge medicine is deeply at odds with the philosophy of primary care medicine, whose mandate is to care for all comers. Still others say it violates an unwritten code in which doctors must share the medical profession's duties equitably. In other words, if some doctors care for only a few rich patients, everyone else has that much more poorly reimbursed work to do.


    Dr. Kaminetsky counters with his own story. Had he not found this way of practicing medicine, he said, he would no longer be seeing patients at all: he would be in a desk job with a pharmaceutical company. A detail-oriented perfectionist who routinely works through lunch and still does his own filing, he was tormented in his previous practice by the impossibility of meeting his own standards.


    "I hated it," Dr. Kaminetsky said. "It was awful. Patients always had a litany of complaints. Driving home, I would think, 'Oh my God, I never saw this test, I never called that patient back.' Some people are not as easily distressed by loose ends. I don't like leaving things undone."


    Now on his busiest days he sees perhaps half the number of patients he used to, spends twice as long with each one and has the time to make every last phone call.


    "I'm really helping a lot of people," he said. "I feel good about what I do. Does everybody deserve this kind of care? Yes, they do. And I don't purport to know the solution."





  • The Vice President




    Jason Reed/Reuters
    Vice President Dick Cheney, left, and I. Lewis Libby Jr., far right, after a White House meeting in July.


    October 30, 2005


    The Vice President

    In Indictment's Wake, a Focus on Cheney's Powerful Role




    WASHINGTON, Oct. 29 - Vice President Dick Cheney makes only three brief appearances in the 22-page federal indictment that charges his chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby Jr., with lying to investigators and misleading a grand jury in the C.I.A. leak case. But in its clear, cold language, it lifts a veil on how aggressively Mr. Cheney's office drove the rationale against Saddam Hussein and then fought to discredit the Iraq war's critics.


    The document now raises a central question: how much collateral damage has Mr. Cheney sustained?


    Many Republicans say that Mr. Cheney, already politically weakened because of his role in preparing the case for war, could be further damaged if he is forced to testify about the infighting over intelligence that turned out to be false. At the least, they say, his office will be temporarily off balance with the resignation of Mr. Libby, who controlled both foreign and domestic affairs in a vice presidential office that has served as a major policy arm for the West Wing.


    "Cheney has had a tight, effective team, and they have been an incredible support system for the presidency," said Rich Bond, a former chairman of the Republican National Committee. "To the degree that that support system is weakened, it's a bad day at the office. But no person is indispensable." For now, David Addington, the vice president's counsel, is the leading candidate to replace Mr. Libby.


    Mr. Cheney's allies noted that there was no suggestion in the indictment that the most powerful vice president in American history, with enormous influence into all important corners of administration policy, had done anything wrong. They also said that Mr. Libby, whose role had been diminished in the past year as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice became more powerful and the leak investigation took its toll, could be quickly replaced from the vice president's large Rolodex of support.


    "His reach within both the party mechanism and the policy structures of the government is so deep that I believe that it is possible to find somebody who would provide the technical and intellectual support that Libby did, even if he doesn't have the same personal relationship that he had with Libby," said Tom Rath, a New Hampshire Republican with White House ties. "That's very hard to duplicate."


    The indictment against Mr. Libby, known as Scooter, alleges that the vice president's office was the hub of a concerted effort to gather information about key critics of the Bush Iraq policy. [Page 26.]


    The larger question, Republicans said, was Mr. Cheney's standing with the public - and what his staff has often called the vice president's constituency of one, Mr. Bush.


    Christie Whitman, the president's former E.P.A. administrator and a longtime Bush family friend who was critical of the White House and the Republican right wing in a recent book, said that she did not expect the president's personal relationship with Mr. Cheney to change. Nonetheless, Ms. Whitman said she believed that if more information about Mr. Cheney's involvement in the leak case became public, "and if it keeps hanging around and getting close to the vice president, he might step aside - but that's an extreme case."


    For now, she said, "Scooter has fallen on his sword, and the focus is on him."


    Paul Light, a vice presidential scholar at New York University's Wagner Graduate School of Public Service, agreed that Mr. Cheney's relationship with Mr. Bush would probably remain solid, but the taint of the scandal could hurt the vice president outside the White House.


    "Cheney becomes a bit of an albatross except with the base, where he's a real rock star," Mr. Light said. "It'll be less possible for him to make campaign trips because this issue will dog him."


    A number of influential Republicans agreed, although they did not want to speak for attribution for fear of harming their relationships with Mr. Cheney.


    "Cheney doesn't have a legal problem, but he has a political problem," said one Republican close to the White House who did not want to be named to avoid public quarrels with the White House. "As the driving force on foreign policy and the Iraq war, his leadership is now nowhere near as credible. Bush has got to approach the stuff coming from the vice president's office with raised eyebrows."


    Others said that Mr. Cheney was far too central at the White House to be diminished by the scandal. "He's a survivor of all time," said Alan Simpson, a former Republican senator from Wyoming and a longtime friend of the vice president. "I never saw him bow his head or go into a cocoon or suck his thumb or anything like that. He's an unflappable man."


    Warren B. Rudman, a former Republican senator from New Hampshire, agreed with that assessment. "Look, Dick Cheney is not running for anything, he's obviously an incredibly important person in the administration, and I don't think that will change inside the White House," Mr. Rudman said. "If he were a normal vice president looking to run in '08, then it would be a totally different situation."


    Most Republicans said that they had not taken seriously recent talk, advanced by conservatives, that Mr. Cheney should be the next Republican presidential candidate. In any case, they said, his history of heart problems, the faulty prewar intelligence and now Mr. Libby's indictment effectively ruled out a political future beyond Mr. Bush's second term. "He's too controversial," Ms. Whitman said.


    Although Mr. Cheney makes only three appearances in the indictment, the episodes tell a story of a vice president directly involved in an effort to learn about Joseph C. Wilson IV, a former diplomat who emerged in 2003 as a critic of the way the administration used prewar intelligence to justify the invasion of Iraq. The episodes do not shed light on the action that set off the special prosecutor nearly two years ago: who first leaked the name of Mr. Wilson's wife, Valerie Wilson, an undercover officer at the C.I.A., as an attempt to denigrate Mr. Wilson's trip as a nepotistic junket arranged by his spouse.


    Mr. Cheney's most interesting appearance in the indictment is on Page 5, where he is described as telling Mr. Libby, on June 12, 2003, that Mr. Wilson's wife worked at the C.I.A. in the counterproliferation division. "Libby understood that the vice president had learned this information from the C.I.A.," the indictment states.


    Mr. Cheney also appears on Page 8, when he flew with Mr. Libby and others on Air Force Two on July 12, 2003, to Norfolk, Va. On the return trip, the indictment states, Mr. Libby "discussed with other officials aboard the plane" what he should say to reporters in response to "certain pending media inquiries," including questions from Matthew Cooper of Time magazine.


    The indictment does not say who the "other officials" are or the nature of the media inquiries, but it does say that on that same day Mr. Libby spoke to Mr. Cooper, and that he confirmed that he had heard that Mr. Wilson's wife was involved in sending him on the trip.


    The indictment comes as other parts of the wall that was built around Mr. Cheney's defense of the war have come tumbling down. Earlier this month, Lawrence Wilkerson, the former chief of staff to Colin L. Powell while he was secretary of state, complained in a speech of a "cabal" between Mr. Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld when it came to Iraq and of a "real dysfunctionality" in the administration's foreign policy team.


    The indictment also serves as fresh evidence to those Republicans who have known Mr. Cheney for decades and say he has changed, and that he reacted to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, by becoming consumed with threats against the nation and his longtime desire to rid Iraq of Mr. Hussein. Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to the first President Bush, said as much in The New Yorker's current issue.


    "I consider Cheney a good friend - I've known him for 30 years," Mr. Scowcroft told Jeffrey Goldberg. "But Dick Cheney I don't know anymore."


    Some Republicans say that Mr. Cheney's relationship with Mr. Bush has already changed, and that he has become less of a mentor to the president after Mr. Bush's nearly five years in office. Still, Mr. Cheney's allies insist that, with or without Mr. Libby, Mr. Cheney will be at the president's side.


    "I don't think it's ever been about Cheney's staff," said Victoria Clarke, a former Pentagon spokeswoman and aide to the first President Bush. "It's about him. Cheney's influence has always been his own."





October 13, 2005

  • The road to hell




    Illustration by Jeff Crosby


    The road to hell


    In the definitive book about the Iraq war, liberal hawk George Packer tells the whole story of America's worst foreign-policy debacle -- and reveals how good intentions can go terribly wrong.


    By Gary Kamiya


    Oct. 07, 2005 | Most of the American left lined up against the war in Iraq. But some did not. Among the liberal intellectuals who supported the invasion was George Packer, a staff writer for the New Yorker. His new book, "The Assassins' Gate: America in Iraq," proves that holding strong opinions about a subject does not prevent a journalist of integrity from reporting the truth, even if it flies in the face of what he had believed. "The Assassins' Gate" is almost certain to stand as the most comprehensive journalistic account of the greatest foreign-policy debacle in U.S. history.


    A funny thing happened to Packer: He went to Iraq. Reporting is a solvent that dissolves illusions quickly if one has an open mind, and Packer brought that and much more. His first-rate reporting from occupied Iraq, and his superb work covering the corridors of power in Washington, offers an extraordinarily wide-ranging portrait of the Iraq war, from its genesis in neoconservative think tanks to its catastrophic execution to its devastating effects on ordinary Americans and Iraqis. Anthony Shadid, in "Night Draws Near: Iraq's People in the Shadow of America's War," offers a deeper portrait of the Iraqi people, but he does not have Packer's majestic scope. "The Assassins' Gate" is the best book yet about the Iraq war.


    Packer's intentions were indisputably good. A man with a finely developed moral sensibility -- perhaps too fine -- Packer never pretended to know that he was right about Iraq. Although he accepted the most dubious and risky motivation for the war, the hubristic dream of implanting democracy by force in the Arab world, his real passion was to liberate the Iraqi people from a loathsome tyrant. He disliked and feared the Bush administration, and ended up throwing the dice on the war more out of hope than certainty.


    "The administration's war was not my war -- it was rushed, dishonest, unforgivably partisan, and destructive of alliances -- but objecting to the authors and their methods didn't seem reason enough to stand in the way. One doesn't get one's choice of wars," he writes. "I wanted Iraqis to be let out of prison; I wanted to see a homicidal dictator removed from power before he committed mass murder again; I wanted to see if an open society stood a chance of taking root in the heart of the Arab world. More than anyone else, Kanan Makiya guided my thinking, and I always found it easier to imagine a happy outcome when I was within earshot of him."


    As much as it is a history of the war itself, this book is a history of the war of ideas around it. For Packer himself, the two key figures in that war were the Iraqi exile Kanan Makiya and the cultural critic and New Republic contributor Paul Berman. Of the two, Makiya is by far more important. He serves as the moral center of the book, embodying the idealism and illusions that Packer himself held. If Makiya appealed to Packer's heart, Berman excited his brain. In many ways, some of them unacknowledged, "The Assassins' Gate" is the story of Packer's disillusionment with the ideas of both men.


    Packer is a rare combination: an excellent reporter, a sophisticated analyst and a fine writer. He was also ubiquitous. No other journalist can match the breadth of Packer's Iraq coverage: He interviewed neocon war architect Richard Perle and talked to ordinary Iraqis after Saddam's fall; he covered a surreal prewar London meeting of Iraqi exiles swarming around Ahmad Chalabi and wrote about a dedicated U.S. Army captain trying to mediate disputes in a Baghdad slum. Reading "The Assassins' Gate" is like being escorted through the corridors of the Pentagon, the lounges of right-wing think tanks and the dangerous streets of Baghdad by a fearless and curious essayist, one simultaneously alive to intellectual nuances and to the human tragedies and triumphs he observes.


    "The Assassins' Gate" is likely to be the definitive guide to one of the most outrageous scandals in U.S. history: the Bush administration's total failure to plan for the aftermath of a war of choice. That failure may have doomed the entire adventure. It cost the United States billions of dollars and hundreds of lives. Its cost to the Iraqi people and nation, which now faces a possible civil war, cannot be calculated. In a just world, Bush, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Rice, Feith and their underlings would be standing before a Senate committee investigating their catastrophic failures, and Packer's book would be Exhibit A.


    Packer begins by exploring what he calls the "war of ideas" that was waged between the end of the first Gulf War in 1991 and the attacks of Sept. 11. He describes the growing schism between the old-guard "realism" of Bush the Elder's administration, which wanted to preserve the balance of power and was suspicious of any American intervention that did not involve "vital national interests," with the far more aggressive neoconservatives, the group of ideologues that were ultimately responsible for the Iraq war. The neocons' muscular, nationalistic vision of foreign policy, rooted in a Manichaean, Cold War anti-communism combined with a kind of chauvinist idealism, had found a home in Reagan's administration. The neocons then migrated into the first Bush administration and various think tanks and pressure groups, including the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), where they kept the bombs fused and ready to go. Sept. 11 provided the opportunity to drop them.


    Packer describes how the first salvo in what was to become the Iraq war was fired by PNAC, whose members included Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, James Woolsey and William Bennett; "more than half of the founding members would go on to assume high positions in the administration of George W. Bush." In 1998, PNAC sent an open letter to President Clinton, arguing that the policy of containment had failed and urging him to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Weakened by the Lewinsky scandal, Clinton reluctantly signed the Iraq Liberation Act. "Regime change in Iraq became official U.S. policy."


    "Why Iraq?" Packer asks. "Why did Iraq become the leading cause of the hawks?" He gives two reasons: Paul Wolfowitz's desire to atone for America's failure to topple Saddam at the end of the first Gulf War, and the neocons' obsession with defending Israel.


    In Packer's account, Wolfowitz is a fascinating, fatally flawed figure, an idealist who failed to take actions in support of his ideals. As Dick Cheney's undersecretary of defense for policy, Wolfowitz went along with Bush I's decision not to oust Saddam at the end of the first Gulf War. But he was haunted by that choice, and determined to rectify it. "More than Perle, Feith, and the neoconservatives in his department -- certainly more than Rumsfeld and Cheney -- Wolfowitz cared," Packer writes. "For him Iraq was personal." Packer holds Wolfowitz largely responsible for the Bush administration's failure to put enough troops into Iraq, and to plan for the aftermath.


    The leading light of the neoconservatives was Richard Perle, whom Packer describes as the Iraq war's "impresario, with one degree of separation from everyone who mattered." A partisan of Israel's hard-line Likud Party and a protégé of neocon Democrat Scoop Jackson, Perle recruited two other staunch advocates of Israel, Douglas Feith and Elliott Abrams, to work for Jackson and hawkish Democrat Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Packer writes, "When I half jokingly suggested that the Iraq War began in Scoop Jackson's office, Perle said, 'There's an element of that.'" In 1985, Perle had met and become friends with an Iraqi exile named Ahmad Chalabi. "By the time of the PNAC letter in January 1998, Perle knew exactly how Saddam could be overthrown: Put Ahmad Chalabi at the head of an army of Iraqi insurgents and back him with American military power and cash."


    Almost all these figures, starting with Scoop Jackson, shared a key obsession: Israel. "In 1996, some of the people in Perle's circle had begun to think about what it would mean for Saddam Hussein to be removed from the Middle East scene. "They concluded it would be very good for Israel," Packer writes. "Perle chaired a study group of eight pro-Likud Americans, including Douglas Feith, who had worked under Perle in the Reagan administration, and David Wurmser, who was the author of the paper produced under the group's auspices ... Afterwards the group was pleased enough with its work to send the paper to the newly elected Israeli prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu." The paper, "A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm," advocated smashing the Palestinians militarily, removing Saddam from power, and installing a Hashemite king on the Iraq throne.


    The dangerous absurdity of this scheme (elements of which appeared in a later book by Perle and Bush speechwriter David Frum, modestly titled "An End to Evil") did not prevent it from being accepted by high officials of the Bush administration. "A few weeks before the start of the Iraq War, a State Department official described for me what he called the 'everybody move over one theory': Israel would annex the occupied territories, the Palestinians would get Jordan, and the Jordanian Hashemites would be restored to the throne of Iraq," Packer writes. The neocons were out-Likuding the Likud: Even Ariel Sharon had long abandoned his beloved "Jordan is Palestine" idea. That Douglas Feith, one of the ideologues who subscribed to such lunatic plans (the departing Colin Powell denounced Feith to President Bush as "a card-carrying member of the Likud") was in charge of planning for Iraq is almost beyond belief.


    "Does this mean that a pro-Likud cabal insinuated its way into the high councils of the U.S. government and took hold of the apparatus of American foreign policy to serve Israeli interests (as some critics of the war have charged, rather than addressing its merits head on?)" Packer asks. "Is neoconservative another word for Jewish (as some advocates of the war have complained, rather than addressing their critics head on)?" Packer does not answer the first question directly, but he makes it clear that the intellectual origins of the war were inseparably tied to neocon concerns about Israel. "For Feith and Wurmser, the security of Israel was probably the prime mover... The idea of realigning the Middle East by overthrowing Saddam Hussein was first proposed by a group of Jewish policy makers and intellectuals who were close to the Likud. And when the second President Bush looked around for a way to think about the uncharted era that began on September 11, 2001, there was one already available."


    While Bush and his Cold War hardliners Cheney and Rumsfeld were preparing to implement the neocons' grand vision of remaking the Middle East so that it would be friendlier to the United States and Israel, what were liberals doing? In Packer's view, those who did not support the war were either naive ditherers or excessively cautious, unwilling to fight for the noble causes that had once drawn liberals. Packer notes the tension between the dovish legacy of Vietnam and the impetus to hawkishness given by the humanitarian wars of the '80s. He writes that he, like most liberals, was a dove, but that the first Gulf War changed his thinking. "[T]he footage of grateful Kuwaitis waving at columns of American troops streaming through the liberated capital knocked something ajar in my worldview. American soldiers were the heroes ... The decade that followed the Gulf War scrambled everything and turned many of the old truths on their heads. The combination of the Cold War's end, the outbreak of genocidal wars and ethnic conflicts in Europe and Africa, and a Democratic presidency made it possible for liberals to contemplate and even advocate the use of force for the first time since the Kennedy years." The drive behind this new, muscular liberalism came from what Packer rightly lauds as "one of the twentieth century's greatest movements, the movement for human rights."


    Packer describes how the Bush administration began taking steps to invade Iraq almost immediately after 9/11. (Packer notes that, as former Treasury Secretary Paul O'Neill recounted, Bush officials were talking about removing Saddam almost as soon as Bush took office in January 2001.) This is familiar territory, but as usual Packer provides some unusual insights. He notes that Bush and Wolfowitz, in particular, bonded: "They believed in the existence of evil, and they had messianic notions of what America should do about it." In March 2002, Bush interrupted a meeting between Condoleezza Rice and three senators to say, "Fuck Saddam. We're taking him out."


    As plans for war raced ahead, a secret new unit was being set up in the Pentagon, overseen by Douglas Feith and his deputy, William Luti, who was such a maniacal hawk that his colleagues called him "Uber-Luti." (At a staff meeting, Luti once called retired Gen. Anthony Zinni a traitor for questioning the Iraq war.) The secret unit was called the Office of Special Plans, and it was charged with planning for Iraq. Packer's account of this office is chilling. Its main purpose was to cook up intelligence to justify the war, which was then "stovepiped" directly to Dick Cheney's neocon chief of staff, I. Lewis Libby (who has now been linked to the Valerie Plame scandal). Its cryptic name as well as its opposition to the traditional intelligence agencies, which had failed to deliver the goods on Saddam, reflected the views of its director, Abram Shulsky, a former Perle aide, housemate of Wolfowitz's at Cornell, and student of the Chicago classics professor Leo Strauss. Strauss, around whom a virtual cult had gathered, had famously discussed esoteric and hidden meanings in great works, and Shulsky wrapped himself in the lofty mantle of his former professor to justify the secret and "innovative" approach of the OSP.


    In fact, besides feeding bogus intelligence from Iraqi exile sources into the rapacious craw of the White House, the OSP was nothing but a spin machine to prepare the way to war: No actual "planning" was done. According to Lt. Col. Karen Kwiatkowski, the "crafting and approval of the exact words to use when discussing Iraq, WMD, and terrorism were, for most of us, the only known functions of OSP and Mr. Shulsky." (Kwiatkowski later recalled a bit of advice she got from a high-level civil servant: "If I wanted to be successful here," she wrote, "I'd better remember not to say anything positive about the Palestinians.")


    The OSP also recruited several Middle East experts, including Harold Rhode, a protégé of the Princeton Arabist Bernard Lewis. Rhode, whose keen grasp of regional realities was reflected in his musing that one way to transform the Middle East would be to change the Farsi alphabet in Iran to Roman, was an ardent proponent, like other neocons, of installing Ahmad Chalabi as prime minister -- thus restoring Shiites to power. "Shiite power was the key to the whole neoconservative vision for Iraq," Packer notes. "The convergence of ideas, interests, and affections between certain American Jews and Iraqi Shia was one of the more curious subplots of the Iraq War ... the Shia and the Jews, oppressed minorities in the region, could do business, and ... traditional Iraqi Shiism (as opposed to the theocratic, totalitarian kind that had taken Iran captive) could lead the way to reorienting the Arab world toward America and Israel."


    But the neocons had a far darker view of Islam and the Muslim world as a whole. "A government official who had frequent dealings with Feith, Rhode and the others came up with an analogy for their attitude toward Islam: 'The same way evangelicals in the South wrestle with homosexuals, they feel about Muslims -- people to be saved, if only they would do things on our terms. Hate the sin, love the sinner."


    With Pentagon planning for a U.S. invasion of a major Arab state in these capable hands, those who were actually working on real plans -- and knew what they were talking about -- were cut out of the process. The State Department's Future of Iraq Project, run by a competent analyst named Tom Warrick, addressed many of the concrete issues that would ultimately bedevil the occupation. But the Pentagon and the White House mistrusted the State Department, which was filled with Arabists and thus ideologically suspect. And the coup de grâce was administered by none other than the lofty idealist turned practical politician Kanan Makiya. Makiya, who had emerged from obscurity to find himself courted by the White House and a figure with influence at the highest levels of the U.S. government, had made the fateful decision to form an alliance with Ahmad Chalabi (Makiya told another Iraqi exile that "Iraq has one democrat -- Ahmad Chalabi"), and had decided that the Future of Iraq Project would weaken Chalabi. The Pentagon ordered the Future of Iraq Project's report shelved.


    The vindictive pettiness of the Bush administration's hawks was astonishing. Warrick himself, who Packer writes "had done as much thinking about postwar Iraq as any American official," was suddenly removed from Jay Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, the predecessor of the Coalition Provisional Authority, at the orders of Dick Cheney, who despised him for ideological reasons. Cheney also ordered the removal of another State Department specialist named Meghan O'Sullivan, because he "disliked some things that O'Sullivan -- a protégé of the ideologically moderate Richard Haass, and therefore suspect -- had written." Know-nothings, true believers and free-market Republicans were installed instead.


    Perhaps the most morally shocking revelation in "The Assassins' Gate" is that the real reason the Bush administration did not plan for the aftermath of the war was that such planning might have prevented the war from taking place. One example of this was the administration's rejection of an offer of help from a coalition of heavyweight bipartisan policy groups. Leslie Gelb, president of the bipartisan Council on Foreign Relations, had offered to assist the administration in its postwar planning: He proposed that his group and two other respected think tanks, the Heritage Foundation and the Center for Strategic and International Studies, prepare a study. "'This is just what we need," Rice said. 'We'll be too busy to do it ourselves.' But she didn't want the involvement of Heritage, which had been critical of the idea of an Iraq war. 'Do AEI instead.'"


    Representatives of the think tanks duly met with National Security Council head Condoleezza Rice and her deputy Stephen Hadley. "John Hamre of CSIS went in expecting to pitch the idea to Rice, but the meeting was odd from the start: Rice seemed attentive only to [AEI president Chris] DeMuth, and it was as if the White House was trying to sell something to the American Enterprise Institute rather than the other way around. When Gelb, on speakerphone from New York, began to describe his concept, DeMuth cut him off. 'Wait a minute. What's all this planning and thinking about postwar Iraq?' He turned to Rice. 'This is nation building, and you said you were against that. In the campaign you said it, the president has said it. Does he know you're doing this? Does Karl Rove know?'


    "Without AEI, Rice couldn't sign on. Two weeks later, Hadley called Gelb to tell him what Gelb already knew: 'We're not going to go ahead with it.' Gelb later explained, 'They thought all those things would get in the way of going to war.'"


    In effect, the far-right AEI was running the White House's Iraq policy -- and the AEI's war-at-all-costs imperatives drove the Pentagon, too. "'The senior leadership of the Pentagon was very worried about the realities of the postconflict phase being known,' a Defense official said, 'because if you are Feith or you are Wolfowitz, your primary concern is to achieve the war.'"


    Those involved in this massive deception have not been punished in any way. The officials who lied to get their war will never pay any price for their deeds. But one could make a legitimate argument that their actions constitute one of the greatest betrayals of the nation in its history.


    If "The Assassins' Gate" achieved nothing more than exposing this grotesque low point in the history of American governance, it would have earned an honored place in the accounts of this catastrophic war. But it does much more. Packer's reporting from Iraq is also exceptional -- varied, empathetic and intelligent. He provides an insider's account of the crucial mistakes -- the disbanding of the Iraqi army, de-Baathification, the failure to provide security and restore services -- that helped doom the occupation. He reveals the appalling cluelessness of the American officials in the Green Zone, almost completely cut off from the deteriorating realities outside. He focuses on several admirable Americans, including a straight-talking Army captain named John Prior, whose efforts to help the Iraqi people are heartbreakingly undermined by the incompetence of their leaders and by the intractable problems of a nation emerging from decades of dictatorship. His chapter about Chris Frosheiser, the anguished father of a young American killed in Iraq, with whom Packer established a personal relationship and who desperately wanted to find out if his son died for something worthwhile, is one of the most moving pieces of journalism to come out of the war.


    Packer's portraits of individual Iraqis, and his assessment of the Iraqi people as a whole, are also compelling. He never forgets that wars and the big ideas behind them always come down, in the end, to the fate of individual human beings. Above all, he is on the side of the Iraqis. He introduces us to an appealing young woman named Aseel, a computer programmer who supports the invasion and whose dreams of a better life "become one index for me of the status of America's vision for Iraq." And he does not shy away from reporting on the many Iraqis who turned against the Americans almost immediately. Like all other observers, he points out that the Americans' failure to restore order, prevent anarchy and provide services played a key role in the Iraqi disillusionment with the United States.


    But Packer's attempt to explain why the Iraqis did not welcome their "liberators" (the word deserves to be put in quotes not because the Americans did not free Iraqis from Saddam, but because the reality that followed was so hideous) still bears some traces of the hawkish illusions that led him to support the war. He cites one Iraqi's belief that his countrymen, ground down by years of dictatorship, "lack the power to experience freedom." And he closes a chapter, tellingly titled "Psychological Demolition," with a similar quote from an exile: "'Never afraid of Saddam -- beaten by the mentality of the Iraqi people.'"


    There is, of course, considerable truth in this explanation for the Iraqi anger at the United States. But Packer fails to adequately grasp other, perhaps more important, reasons -- which are laid out in Anthony Shadid's "Night Draws Near." As Shadid reports, the main reason many if not most Iraqis opposed the U.S. war was national pride and a deep sense of honor, combined with a profound distrust of the West engendered by British colonial rule and smoldering anger at America for its near-total support for Israel in its conflict with the Palestinians. Getting rid of Saddam, even if the aftermath of the invasion had gone better, would not have made these attitudes go away.


    And there is, of course, another reason the Iraqis were angry at the U.S.: the war itself. Packer reports on incidents in which innocent Iraqis are killed by jittery G.I.'s, and includes a harrowing scene of a nasty, possibly sadistic young pretty-boy soldier taunting some terrified captives. He also grasps the full import of Abu Ghraib, and, to his credit, assigns ultimate responsibility for that national disgrace to the Bush administration. Yet unlike Shadid, he does not delve into the full horror of war. Shadid tells the stories of innocent Iraqi boys torn apart by American bullets; of families huddled in terror in Baghdad before the invasion, waiting for the bombs to fall; of families shattered, homes wrecked, the innumerable hideous events that always happen during and after war.


    Packer is aware of those horrors, but they are not part of his central narrative. He remains invested in the idea of a good war, a liberating war, and averse to the "familiar postures" of the left, whose "softer, more cautious worldview ... often amounted in practice to isolationism." Even at the end of his book, Packer remains unrepentant about his support for the war.


    Packer's attitudes and beliefs about the war play a curious, elusive role in "The Assassins' Gate." He does not foreground them, but neither does he shrink from revealing them. What makes those beliefs hard to pin down is that some -- but not all -- of them changed in the course of his experiences, and Packer does not always inform us of when. To paraphrase the old line about Nixon, it is difficult to know what Packer knew and when he knew it.


    For example, Packer argues that Bush officials "were peculiarly unsuited to deal with the consequences of the Bush Doctrine" because, as Cold War hawks and believers in the unfettered use of American power, they had "sat out the debates of the 1990s about humanitarian war, international standards, nation building, democracy promotion ... When September 11 forced the imagination to grapple with something radically new, the president's foreign-policy advisors reached for what they had always known. The threat, as they saw it, lay in well-armed enemy states. The answer, as ever, was military power and the will to use it."


    This analysis is acute, and it goes a long way to explaining the Bush administration's failures in the post-invasion period. But Packer does not tell us when he reached this conclusion about Team Bush. Did he know it from the start, but decided to support the war anyway, because "one doesn't get one's choice of wars"? Or did he only reach it after the fact?


    Packer's decision not to emphasize his own place in the narrative is understandable, and mostly laudable. "The Assassins' Gate" is mainly a work of history, and an exceptionally reliable one. All that matters in historical works is whether something is true, not when the historian learned it. But insofar as the book is about Packer's own beliefs, and insofar as those beliefs shed light on a whole set of arguments about the wisdom and morality of the Iraq war, the question does matter. To understand those beliefs, we must look more closely at the two figures that guided and defined them before the war: Kanan Makiya and Paul Berman. How much Packer still subscribes to their ideas is one of the lingering questions left by his book: It is possible that he does not know himself.


    That Packer was drawn to Makiya is not surprising. Of all those who argued for the war, Makiya was by far the most convincing. A brilliant, impassioned writer who refused to allow the West to forget the dreadful crimes of Saddam Hussein, who argued that the Iraqi people deserved a Western-style democracy, his support for the war carried the stamp of moral authority. Packer noticed Makiya walking around Cambridge, Mass., where Packer was living at the time, and introduced himself. So begins a relationship that runs like a unifying thread through the book. Makiya is Virgil to Packer's Dante, a man whose unimpeachable decency, idealism and courage coexists with a naiveté verging on myopia and -- it turns out -- a near-complete lack of knowledge of the land he had fled so many years before.


    Much of the pathos of "The Assassins' Gate" derives from Packer's increasing realization that Makiya's beautiful vision bore no connection to reality. Over the course of his reporting from Iraq, Packer realized just how disconnected from Iraq Makiya was. As the situation in Iraq deteriorated in the summer after the invasion, Packer ran into his mentor in Baghdad. Makiya was working on a project called the Memory Foundation, a memorial to the dreadful decades of Saddam's rule which he hoped would "[reshape] Iraqis' perceptions of themselves in such a way as to create the basis for a tolerant civil society that is capable of adjusting to liberal democratic culture."


    By now, Packer has little patience for such projects, however well-meaning. "Makiya was consumed with thoughts about the past and the future; I wanted him to acknowledge that the present was a disaster. Phrases like 'tolerant civil society' and 'liberal democratic culture' did not inspire me in Baghdad in the summer of 2003. They sounded abstract and glib amid the daily grinding chaos of the city, and they made me angry at him and myself -- for I had had my own illusions."


    By the end of the book, Packer seems to have come to terms with Makiya's doomed idealism: The book closes with the exile's ambiguous self-description: "I think it was Ahmad who once said of me that I represent the triumph of hope over experience."


    Of course, urging war on the basis of a foolish hope is more excusable coming from Kanan Makiya than it is from an American. Iraq is not our country, and while it may be true that we are all our brothers' keepers, only the most internationalist of altruists would demand that a nation sacrifice its own interests for the sake of an oppressed foreign country. Although at times Packer seems close to being that kind of altruist, he also believes -- or at least believed -- not only that invading Iraq was the right thing to do for the Iraqi people, but also that it was in America's own interests. To understand his thinking, we must examine the ideas of Paul Berman, echoes of whose ideas can be found in "The Assassins' Gate."


    Packer recounts how he came to know Berman. "[E]xtraordinary times call for new thinking. Searching for a compass through the era just begun, I was drawn to people who thought boldly. One of them was the writer Paul Berman, who was working out a theory about what was now being called the war on terrorism." Berman was Packer's neighbor in Brooklyn, and Packer would meet with Berman over late-night dinners at a neighborhood bistro, where the older man would expound on his ideas.


    Berman was immersed in the work of the seminal Islamist thinker Sayyid Qutb. "Qutb's ideas confirmed the theory that Berman had begun to develop, which was this: The young Arab men who had steered those four airplanes to apocalyptic death were not products of an alien world. They weren't driven by Muslim tradition, or Third World poverty, or the clash of civilizations, or Western imperialism. They were modern, and the ideology that held them and millions of others across the Islamic world in its ecstatic grip had been produced by the modern world -- in fact, by the West. It was the same nihilistic fantasy of revolutionary power and mass slaughter that, in the last century, drove Germans and Italians and Spaniards and Russians (and millions of others across the world) to similar acts of apocalyptic death. This ideology had a name: totalitarianism."


    Packer writes that he was drawn to the fierce intensity of Berman's intellectual quest and found his ideas compelling. "I listened, occasionally asking a skeptical question, admiring the dedication of his project (who else was really trying to figure this stuff out?), mostly sympathizing -- but also worrying about Berman's tendency toward sweeping, distinction-erasing intellectual moves. What, for example, did his theory have to do with Iraq?" The answer Berman gave was simple. Both Islamism and Saddam's Stalinist state were totalitarian, implacably opposed to liberal societies, to freedom itself, and so they had to be opposed just as Hitler and Stalin had to be opposed.


    "He was responding viscerally to the event (our late-night talks kept coming back to the scale of destruction just across the East River, shocking evidence of the Islamists' ambition) and also at an extremely high level of abstraction, where details become specks," writes Packer in "The Assassins' Gate." This passage foreshadows what Packer was soon to discover: that Berman's grand ideas would not survive contact with Iraq. (It would have been more accurate if Packer had substituted the word "reality" for "details.") But at the time Berman and Packer were discussing these ideas -- late 2002 and early 2003 -- he subscribed to them.


    In 2003 Packer edited "The Fight Is for Democracy," a collection of essays by contrarian liberals, including Berman, many of them pro-war. In his introduction, Packer called for a "vibrant, hardheaded liberalism" that is willing to embrace the use of American military power and that stands up unapologetically for democratic values. The key test of this "vibrant liberalism" was the coming war in Iraq. For Packer, as for Berman, Iraq was the first front in a noble and necessary war between democracy and an absolute ideology of control and death.


    "The fight against political Islam isn't a clash of civilizations, and it isn't an imperialist campaign," noted Packer in "The Fight Is for Democracy." "As Paul Berman writes, it is a conflict of ideologies and they come down to the century-old struggle between totalitarianism and liberal democracy." The key concept here is the seemingly innocuous expression "political Islam." Like Christopher Hitchens' neologism, "Islamofascism," what this phrase did was allow Packer and Berman to lump al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein together as part of the same threat -- an obviously important move if one is trying to justify invading Iraq, which had no actual connection to al-Qaida.


    Berman's convoluted attempt to connect Saddam's secular Baath Party and the Islamist al-Qaida is a feat worthy of a medieval schoolman. But at bottom, it is simply a fancier version of the justification for war put forward by another liberal hawk, Thomas L. Friedman. Friedman also advocated toppling Saddam, but not because of some supposed ideological or historical connection between Baathism and Islamism. His argument was more straightforward: A "terrorism bubble" had built up in the Arab world, and it needed to be popped. As a convenient evil tyrant, Saddam simply offered a good opportunity for the United States to smash the Arab world in the face and teach it a lesson. Neither Friedman nor Berman ever explained exactly how smashing the Arab world in the face was going to turn it away from Islamist radicalism, or why the dubious attempt to install democracy by force in a fractured, wounded land with a bitter experience of colonial rule was worth risking thousands of American lives for. But intoxicated by what he with typical self-critical honesty called "the first sip of this drink called humanitarian intervention," and fastidiously put off by what he perceived as the crudeness of the antiwar movement, Packer signed on for the crusade.


    It is scarcely necessary to point out that history has not been kind to the ideas of the liberal hawks. The Arab world, far from falling on its knees in "awe" before American might, as neocon analyst Reuel Marc Gerecht predicted, hates us more than ever. The terror bubble has not been popped: In fact, the Iraq invasion has only increased the danger of terror attacks, according to numerous studies. (And not just studies: The postwar terror attacks in London, Madrid and Bali hardly support the bomb-'em-to-their-knees argument.) And as for the Iraqi people, so far the war has arguably brought them even greater misery than they experienced under Saddam, at least over an equal period of time. Packer writes in "The Assassins' Gate" that "no Iraqi I knew" ever said things were better under Saddam, but Anthony Shadid talked to several Iraqis who said exactly that -- and that was before the situation in Iraq got even worse. To be sure, in the long run the war may prove to have improved their lot. But if a civil war breaks out -- if it has not already done so -- even the humanitarian moral scales will tip irrevocably against the invasion.


    Packer presumably knows all this, but he refuses to admit that the idea of invading Iraq was wrong -- only the execution. "Since America's fate is now tied to Iraq's, it might be years or even decades before the wisdom of the war can finally be judged," Packer writes. "The Iraq War was always winnable; it still is." In other words, it is too soon to say if our national interest has been harmed by the war. Even taking a long historical view, this seems untenably optimistic. For the reasons listed above, and many others -- the damage done to our civil society by a war based on lies not least of them -- the Iraq war has been a debacle probably without precedent in our history. The Iraqi people may eventually find their lot improved, although that is far from certain. But to argue that the invasion could still prove to have been in our interests, that we can still "win" it, is to ascend into the realm of futurist fantasy, like arguing that the Vietnam War could still prove to be a good idea.


    Packer's support for the war is inseparable from his critique of the antiwar movement, and contemporary liberalism in general. He dismisses antiwar protests as naive: "The protesters saw themselves as defending Iraqis from the terrible fate that the United States was prepared to inflict on them. Why would Iraqis want war? The movement's assumptions were based on moral innocence -- on an inability to imagine the horror in which Iraqis lived, and a desire for all good things to go together, for total vindication. War is evil; therefore, the prevention of war must be good."


    Packer is not completely wrong about the moral innocence, and political naiveté, of much of the antiwar movement. But his characterization of it is surprisingly reductive. In his haste to reject liberal realist arguments as "cautious" and "soft-headed," Packer never engages with the robust body of morally engaged liberals and leftists who opposed both Saddam and the war on powerful realist grounds. He fails to address the arguments made by thinkers like Mark Danner, Tony Judt, Brian Urquhart and many others, hardheaded arguments that were made immediately after 9/11 and that found their home in the New York Review of Books, the pages of this journal and many other places. A corollary is that he fails to grasp the importance of historical context. About Arab or Muslim grievances, in particular the U.S. support for despotic Arab regimes and the crucial Israeli-Palestinian conflict, he has almost nothing to say.


    The truth is that many opponents of the war knew perfectly well how dreadful Saddam was, but opposed the war not out of moral innocence but because it was too risky for both the United States and for the Iraqi people, because it was illegal, and because it was being waged by George W. Bush.


    And also because war is evil. Yes, sometimes wars must be fought. The battle for the freedom of humankind against the Axis, the humanitarian interventions in Kosovo and Bosnia, the self-defensive strike against the Taliban -- those were all justified wars. But Kosovo is not Iraq, and Saddam Hussein was no Hitler. The pages of the newspapers for the last two and a half years prove it: War itself is a terrible thing, and making war is almost always a sign of total failure, the ultimate defeat of the human spirit. Good intentions do not matter. William S. Burroughs' cautionary words to those contemplating shooting heroin -- "Look down LOOK DOWN along that junk road before you travel there" -- also apply to those who would make war. Packer and his fellow liberal hawks did not look far enough.


    In the end, however, Packer's support for the war, and his failure to engage with the most compelling arguments against it, fade in comparison to his achievements. What matters is that he has given us a remarkable history of the Iraq war, a work of keen analysis, superb reporting and deep compassion. "The Assassins' Gate" is required reading for anyone who wants to understand the terrible predicament in which we now find ourselves, how we got there, and why we must not repeat the same tragic mistake.


    This story has been corrected since it was originally published.



    -- By Gary Kamiya

  • The Marriage of Sex and Death




    The Marriage of Sex and Death
    The nightmarish vision of Mary Gaitskill.
    By Francine Prose
    Posted Monday, Oct. 10, 2005, at 7:09 AM PT

    There's a way in which each novel we read enters into a conversation with every other novel we've read. Even though they may have been written in different eras and places, they can talk to one another because they speak essentially the same language: They follow a narrative arc, they include a cast of characters who may or may not remind us of people we know, and they create a world that in some sense mirrors the world outside the novel.

    And then there are novels that speak a language entirely their own. We recognize them as novels, though we would have a hard time saying why that should be so. They may have some, or none, of the elements I've listed above, but these features seem almost extraneous or inessential. Beckett's Molloy transferring his sucking stones from pocket to pocket is hardly what one would call a plot. The odd women in Two Serious Ladies all blither on in pretty much the same voice and seem to meld into one another, which is part of Jane Bowles' intention. And the universe of Juan Rulfo's Pedro Paramo, one in which past and present blur and in which it hardly matters whether someone is alive or dead, makes Ulysses seem, by contrast, like Middlemarch. When we remember these untraditional novels, we tend to forget trivial and even relatively important details of story and character. What stays with us is an atmosphere, an emotion, the memory of how it felt to read the book and of what it was like to inhabit a particular sensibility—the mind of a character or of an author—for a certain period of time. Perhaps what we recall most vividly is how a writer's language rose to meet the challenge of maintaining our interest without the conventions (suspense, and so forth) that more commonly sustain it.

    Mary Gaitskill's new book, Veronica, is one of these unconventional fictions, though among its peculiar charms is the fact that it seems to think of itself as a much more ordinary sort of novel than it is. There is, I suppose, a plot: An ailing former model named Alison looks back on the decade before the ravages of AIDS were at least partly tamed by today's pharmacopeia of antiviral drugs. There are subsidiary characters: Alison's family, her lovers, and especially the eponymous co-worker and friend whose extreme eccentricity and personal style provide a simultaneously inspiring and cautionary example for our heroine. And there is a milieu, or a series of milieus: the high life in New York and Paris in the 1980s, and the low life, cleaning offices in California after Alison's advancing age and declining beauty result in a severe status demotion. But unlike Jennifer Egan's astonishing Look at Me, which really is about (among other things) modeling, Veronica offers just enough details about the photo studio, the modeling agency, and the office as are required for a spare version of verisimilitude; precisely as much, and no more, reality as seems necessary before the book can dispense with the formalities and get on with its concerns.

    Some of these concerns—sex, solitude, power relations, the way that friendship (particularly female friendship based on inequalities of one sort or another) can form and scar us more deeply than a love affair—will be familiar to fans of Gaitskill's work. But what's most unusual about Veronica is how much: The experience of reading it seems rather like biting into a nightmare-inducing, virally loaded madeleine. Halfway through, you may find yourself remembering things you'd forgotten about a moment in time when half your friends were dying young, and when you feared that anyone who had ever had sex (including, of course, yourself) was doomed to a premature and hideous demise.

    Meanwhile, it may occur to you that Gaitskill may be, among contemporary authors, the one best-suited to capture, on the page, a period when the marriage of sex and death was such an extraordinarily close one.

    Gaitskill has always written incisively about the paradox of sexual intimacy and individual isolation, a contradiction that takes on additional resonance when death is added to the equation: Suddenly, the experience that promises to unite us most closely with another human being can lead directly to the experience that will separate us not only from the lover but from the whole living world. Here, it's Veronica's affair with the bisexual and seductive Duncan that seems like the purest form of love: an operatic passion that quite consciously involves and seeks not only self-sacrifice but self-destruction.

    One aspect of Gaitskill's fiction that has never seemed more paradoxically subtle and explicit than it does in this book is its undercurrent of religiosity. For a writer who has proved so refreshingly offhand and relaxed about exploring the kinkier frontiers of sexuality, Gaitskill has always seemed (at least to me) possessed by an almost Calvinist vision of sin and damnation, of guilt and expiation. As Alison muses in the last third of the novel, "By the time I moved to New York, I had not prayed for many years. But there was a soft dark place where prayer had been and sometimes my mind wandered into it. Sometimes this softness was restful and kind. Sometimes it was not. Sometimes when I went into it, I felt like a little piece of flesh chewed by giant teeth. I felt that everyone was being chewed. To ease my terror, I pictured beautiful cows with liquid eyes eating acres of grass with loose jaws. I said to myself, Don't be afraid. Everything is meant to be chewed, and also to keep making more flesh to be chewed. All prayer is prayer to the giant teeth."

    The AIDS era was, perhaps needless to say, a time when those concepts (sin, etc.) and the giant teeth surfaced from our Puritan background and took (or resumed) their place in the forefront of mass consciousness. Throughout Veronica, I found myself thinking of its characters, punished excessively for looking for love in all the wrong places, as figures writhing in the teeming hells envisioned by Netherlandish painters. Here, as elsewhere, Gaitskill is the poet of bad sex:

    Fucking Gregory Carson was like falling down the rabbit hole and seeing things flying by without knowing what they meant. Except I was the rabbit hole at the same time, and he was stuffing things down it like crazy, just throwing everything in, like he couldn't get rid of it fast enough ... Like he was stuffing me full of him so that any picture of me would be a picture of him, too, because people who looked would see him staring out of my eyes.

    But in this book, for the first time, the awkward, unsatisfying, or painful sexual encounter can result not only in making a character feel worse than she did before but can prove fatal. The punishment is no longer a playful spanking, as it was in her story collection, Bad Behavior. In Veronica, alienated sex, and indeed all sex, has become, or has the potential to become, a capital crime.

    Another image (in addition to the Netherlandish hells) that kept creeping, unbidden, into my mind while I was reading Veronica was Robert Mapplethorpe's late portrait of himself as a wasted, moribund Satan. The image is, of course, thematically relevant to the novel and to the historical period in which it is set. But more important, the way the Mapplethorpe photograph imprints itself on one's mind seems somehow illustrative of what I mean about how we recall a certain sort of novel. Trying to recollect more conventional fictions, we may find ourselves paging back through them, searching for some forgotten plot turn, some event or aspect of character. But like the Mapplethorpe photo, Veronica places no such strain on our memory. It creates an atmosphere, provokes a response, and suffuses us with an emotion that we can easily, all too easily, summon up. It's art that you can continue to see even with your eyes closed.

    Francine Prose is the author, most recently, of A Changed Man.