January 30, 2006















  • Bloggers Beware.




    The document says information is “critical to military success



    The wide-reaching document was signed off by Donald Rumsfeld

    US plans to ‘fight the net’ revealed


    US plans to ‘fight the net’ revealed








    By Adam Brookes
    BBC Pentagon correspondent



    A newly declassified document gives a fascinating glimpse into the US military’s plans for “information operations” – from psychological operations, to attacks on hostile computer networks.



    Bloggers beware.

    As the world turns networked, the Pentagon is calculating the military opportunities that computer networks, wireless technologies and the modern media offer.

    From influencing public opinion through new media to designing “computer network attack” weapons, the US military is learning to fight an electronic war.

    The declassified document is called “Information Operations Roadmap”. It was obtained by the National Security Archive at George Washington University using the Freedom of Information Act.

    Officials in the Pentagon wrote it in 2003. The Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, signed it.







    Most computers will open PDF documents automatically, but you may need to download Adobe Acrobat Reader.


    The “roadmap” calls for a far-reaching overhaul of the military’s ability to conduct information operations and electronic warfare. And, in some detail, it makes recommendations for how the US armed forces should think about this new, virtual warfare.

    The document says that information is “critical to military success”. Computer and telecommunications networks are of vital operational importance.

    Propaganda

    The operations described in the document include a surprising range of military activities: public affairs officers who brief journalists, psychological operations troops who try to manipulate the thoughts and beliefs of an enemy, computer network attack specialists who seek to destroy enemy networks.

    All these are engaged in information operations.



    Perhaps the most startling aspect of the roadmap is its acknowledgement that information put out as part of the military’s psychological operations, or Psyops, is finding its way onto the computer and television screens of ordinary Americans.

    “Information intended for foreign audiences, including public diplomacy and Psyops, is increasingly consumed by our domestic audience,” it reads.

    “Psyops messages will often be replayed by the news media for much larger audiences, including the American public,” it goes on.

    The document’s authors acknowledge that American news media should not unwittingly broadcast military propaganda. “Specific boundaries should be established,” they write. But they don’t seem to explain how.

    “In this day and age it is impossible to prevent stories that are fed abroad as part of psychological operations propaganda from blowing back into the United States – even though they were directed abroad,” says Kristin Adair of the National Security Archive.

    Credibility problem

    Public awareness of the US military’s information operations is low, but it’s growing – thanks to some operational clumsiness.







    When it describes plans for electronic warfare, or EW, the document takes on an extraordinary tone. It seems to see the internet as being equivalent to an enemy weapons system


    Late last year, it emerged that the Pentagon had paid a private company, the Lincoln Group, to plant hundreds of stories in Iraqi newspapers. The stories – all supportive of US policy – were written by military personnel and then placed in Iraqi publications.

    And websites that appeared to be information sites on the politics of Africa and the Balkans were found to be run by the Pentagon.

    But the true extent of the Pentagon’s information operations, how they work, who they’re aimed at, and at what point they turn from informing the public to influencing populations, is far from clear.

    The roadmap, however, gives a flavour of what the US military is up to – and the grand scale on which it’s thinking.

    It reveals that Psyops personnel “support” the American government’s international broadcasting. It singles out TV Marti – a station which broadcasts to Cuba – as receiving such support.

    It recommends that a global website be established that supports America’s strategic objectives. But no American diplomats here, thank you. The website would use content from “third parties with greater credibility to foreign audiences than US officials”.

    It also recommends that Psyops personnel should consider a range of technologies to disseminate propaganda in enemy territory: unmanned aerial vehicles, “miniaturized, scatterable public address systems”, wireless devices, cellular phones and the internet.

    ‘Fight the net’

    When it describes plans for electronic warfare, or EW, the document takes on an extraordinary tone.

    It seems to see the internet as being equivalent to an enemy weapons system.

    “Strategy should be based on the premise that the Department [of Defense] will ‘fight the net’ as it would an enemy weapons system,” it reads.

    The slogan “fight the net” appears several times throughout the roadmap.

    The authors warn that US networks are very vulnerable to attack by hackers, enemies seeking to disable them, or spies looking for intelligence.

    “Networks are growing faster than we can defend them… Attack sophistication is increasing… Number of events is increasing.”

    US digital ambition

    And, in a grand finale, the document recommends that the United States should seek the ability to “provide maximum control of the entire electromagnetic spectrum”.

    US forces should be able to “disrupt or destroy the full spectrum of globally emerging communications systems, sensors, and weapons systems dependent on the electromagnetic spectrum”.

    Consider that for a moment.

    The US military seeks the capability to knock out every telephone, every networked computer, every radar system on the planet.

    Are these plans the pipe dreams of self-aggrandising bureaucrats? Or are they real?

    The fact that the “Information Operations Roadmap” is approved by the Secretary of Defense suggests that these plans are taken very seriously indeed in the Pentagon.

    And that the scale and grandeur of the digital revolution is matched only by the US military’s ambitions for it.















     







    John Cassavetes




    Film Forum John Cassavetes with Mia Farrow in “Rosemary’s Baby” (1968).


    January 29, 2006

    ‘Accidental Genius: How John Cassavetes Invented American Independent Film,’ by Marshall Fine

    Under His Influence




    SEVENTEEN years after his death in 1989, John Cassavetes’s stock continues to rise. Revered worldwide as one of the dominant models for personal filmmaking, his pictures are reissued in fancy DVD boxed sets, shown in retrospectives and taught in universities. Yet during his lifetime his work was often dismissed as confused and self-indulgent. Of all major American directors, it has probably taken him longest to gain his critical due.


    Marshall Fine, film and TV critic for Star magazine, has written the first genuine biography of this increasingly influential figure. An avowed devotee, Fine set out “to kindle the same kind of excitement and curiosity about Cassavetes’ work in readers” that he felt, and he has accomplished his goal with “Accidental Genius,” an absorbing, well-researched book. “My approach has always been journalistic, piecing together a story,” writes Fine, whose prose style, in truth, rarely rises above the journalistically serviceable. But the material is riveting, the story moves briskly, and the real triumph lies in its central portrait. Cassavetes comes alive on the page, his restless spirit captured in all its contradictoriness.


    Fortunately, Fine is no hagiographer. We see many instances of Cassavetes acting like a jerk, or at cross-purposes: an egalitarian who led others by manic charisma; a provocateur who disliked violence and nudity on screen; a proponent of the uneasy who recut his films when preview audiences responded enthusiastically, yet whose favorite director was the crowd-pleasing Frank Capra; a generous helper to beginners, who often hurt himself by insulting studio higher-ups; a wise soul and an immature prankster.


    Cassavetes was himself an actor of fine, if narrow, intensities, so it figures he would evolve an actor-centered cinema. He began acting, he admitted, to capture girls’ attention and to compensate for his small stature. He idolized James Cagney “because he was short – and tough.” Starting out with juvenile delinquent roles, Cassavetes graduated, during the heyday of live television in the 50′s, to brooding male leads in the Brando-Dean mold. He also won the heart of the gorgeous, talented actress Gena Rowlands, who married him and formed with him a lifelong artistic partnership.


    Stymied by conventional film and theater practices, he began improvising scenes with young actors; the result was his first directed film, “Shadows” (1959), a work of raw, lyrical charm. From that start, he created the template that would produce “Faces,” “Husbands,” “Opening Night” and the five other movies that carried his personal vision. What Fine says about his masterpiece, “A Woman Under the Influence,” could apply equally to the others: “It is an uncompromising film that refuses to go where the audience would like. It has the untidiness and illogic of real life, with people acting against their own best interests, hurting the ones they love and immediately regretting it.” Such films were hard to finance, and Cassavetes broke the first Hollywood rule – never use your own money – by mortgaging his house, funneling his acting fees into his productions and even distributing them himself.


    The book is particularly strong on Cassavetes’s work methods. He was, it turns out, “a human script factory,” always writing or dictating another screenplay. Cassavetes resented being saddled with the “improvisation” label when so much of his work was scripted; but it was partly his fault. He muddied the waters by confessing how he loved to make use of accidents and surprises. Still, he maintained that the only improvised parts were the impromptu movements, like crossing a room, in the midst of line deliveries.


    To keep the acting free and open, Cassavetes insisted on not blocking or lighting elaborately beforehand. The camera had to adjust to the actors, necessitating a hand-held, semi-documentary style. Film critics’ initial resistance to him may have reflected their formalist preference for the carefully composed shot, as in Ford and Antonioni. Cassavetes had hit upon a new kind of destabilized, fluid image, and if his films do have ravishing visual passages, they come from the camera serendipitously following actors’ natural rhythms. This darting camerawork supported his vision of life as a shifting, bewildering affair; it also meant that the actors had to stay in the moment, never knowing when the camera was on them.


    People had to be moved out of their comfort zones to elicit moments of true feeling. Peter Falk, who took awhile getting used to Cassavetes’s methods, reported, “On ‘Husbands,’ he’d run in front of the camera, put a banana up your behind – he’d do anything.” All this rests on the questionable assumption that what is most off-balance or unfamiliar is most authentic. There are revelations in Cassavetes’s films that show with startling clarity the map of human confusion, but there are also scenes where actors fumble and bluster through embarrassing shtick.


    Being a booster, the author can’t seriously engage any arguments against Cassavetes’s artistry. Each film is recounted scene by scene – space that might have been better spent in balanced criticism. Then again, he has not meant to do a critical biography. If the personal treatment of the formative years tends to devolve later into a march through directorial projects, it may be because Cassavetes came to pour everything of substance into his work. A man of enormous stamina, he could go for days on nothing but cigarettes, coffee and booze; in the end, he died of cirrhosis of the liver. It was an inadvertent suicide on the part of a man who once said, “I’m a great believer in spontaneity because I think planning is the most destructive thing in the world.”


    Fine justly credits Cassavetes with creating a cinema of emotion; breaking new ground in his focus on middle-class suburban lives; altering the spatial frame; and changing the way films were financed and distributed, by going outside the studio system. I wish he hadn’t harped on the idea that Cassavetes “invented American independent film,” which may be true, but is a mixed compliment, given the mediocrity of most indies. I prefer to think this director’s chief legacy was an astonishing set of films that invite a different relationship to being in the moment, and in which the mystery of human behavior dictates that anything can happen at any time to anyone.


    Phillip Lopate’s film criticism was collected in “Totally, Tenderly, Tragically,” and his anthology “American Movie Critics” will be published in March.











    Reagan Presidency



    I will honestly confess to a brain freeze when it comes to understanding the Reagan Presidency.


    When I read about the details of Mrs. Reagan, referred to as “mommy” by “Ronnie”, it boggles my mind to imagine that there were overtures to psychics in order to map out the Presidential travel plans.


    More than one former staffer in the Reagan White House has related the bizarre world of decision making influenced by Mrs. Reagan, who held more power than any other elected official in America at that time.


    There are also credible accounts of the President resting comfortably with uninterrupted afternoon naps, and his complete dependence on teleprompters to distinguish the topic and the point of reference for whatever speech was being delivered at the moment.


    Maybe I miss something in the translation, but where does the Reagan Presidency not benefit from  the inexorable course of history, as opposed to taking credit for things that would have happened in spite of his tenure.


    Finally, how did this so called “Evil Empire”, that supposedly threatened the free world with world domination, collapse under its own weight with rusting missiles in inoperable silos, literally overnight.


    By the time Reagan demanded Gorbachev to “Take down that wall”, the evil empire had nothing but economic disaster.


    They did not only take the wall down, they dissolved the entire USSR.


    Did our Intelligence community completely misread the reality of the Soviet condition?


    Or was this “Paper Tiger” created to boslter the Defense Industry in their efforts to deploy an 800 ship Navy for which there was acknowledgedly insufficient personnel to get them out of dry dock.


    There is also the “Star Wars” proposal which was also to defend against the indomitable Soviet threat.


    Somebody must have known this “Evil Empire ” was gasping its last breath.


    With due respect to Dennis Miller, ‘I could be wrong, but that is the way I see it’.


    Michael P. Whelan


     



     







    ‘President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination,’ by Richard Reeves




    Gary Hershorn/Reuters; Larry Rubenstein/U.P.I.; Gary Hershorn/Reuters; Gary Hershorn/ReutersRonald Reagan, with (from left) former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher; King Fahd of Saudi Arabia; Mikhail Gorbachev; former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada


    January 29, 2006

    ‘President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination,’ by Richard Reeves

    The Great Delegator




    ON the afternoon before the opening of the Group of 7 summit meeting in 1983, James Baker, the White House chief of staff, dropped in on Ronald Reagan to deliver a briefing book. The United States was the host of the conference, the only one held on American soil during the Reagan presidency; the administration had pre-emptively billed the meeting as a triumph; and Baker, worried about his boss’s lack of preparation and aware that “Reaganomics” wasn’t universally popular, had taken a lot of trouble compiling the briefings, which were both concise and comprehensive. On returning the next morning, Baker was furious to discover that the book lay exactly where he had left it – and confronted his boss with his failure to do his prep. Reagan’s unflustered reply: “Well, Jim, ‘The Sound of Music’ was on last night.”


    Ronald Reagan is a gold mine of presidential anecdotes (this one is from Lou Cannon). But try to understand the man behind the yarns and the gold turns to dross. His official biographer, Edmund Morris, found him such an elusive figure that he resorted to the Reaganesque technique of mixing fact with fiction, producing a dog’s dinner of a book. There are wonderful books about the world that created Reaganism, most notably Steven Hayward’s “Age of Reagan.” There are impressive studies of this problem or that policy. But anybody who wants to understand the man must still return to Cannon, who was Reagan’s “journalistic shadow,” in Richard Reeves’s words, in both Sacramento and Washington, and who produced monumental studies of his time as governor and president.


    One reason Reagan is so difficult to understand is the contrast between achievement and effort. Reagan was undoubtedly a “transformative” president – arguably the most important since Franklin D. Roosevelt. He restored confidence in America after the malaise of the Carter years; re-energized the presidency after the trauma of Watergate; and revolutionized assumptions about what government could and couldn’t do. His economic policies supercharged incentives for entrepreneurs, who were taking over from big companies as the engines of the economy; and his huge arms buildup put timely pressure on the crumbling Soviet system.


    Yet the man who presided over such dramatic changes was frequently out to lunch. He was never exactly a Stakhanovite: he started his day with the comics and took frequent time for naps, sometimes in cabinet meetings. But as his presidency wore on, his mind began to fail, the victim, as it turned out, of incipient dementia.


    The other reason he is so elusive is the contrast between his geniality and his remoteness. Reagan had the gift of likability, always ready with a smile and a joke. Yet he didn’t really need people. He was perfectly content with his own company – reading conservative publications or watching old movies – and he tended to treat people as either hired help or an audience. Martin Anderson, an adviser, described him as “the most warmly ruthless man I’ve ever seen.” “You can get just so far to Ronnie, and then something happens,” said Nancy, who was probably the only person who really got close to him.


    Now Reeves brings a biographical technique that he has honed in two previous books – on Kennedy and Nixon – to the Reagan enigma. The essence of this technique is to focus on the goals that his subjects set for themselves and then immerse the reader in a river of narrative. “I have tried to show what it was like for each of these men to be president,” he explains. This makes for refreshingly nonjudgmental books (though Reeves is clearly no fan of Reagan’s economic policies); it also makes for highly readable ones, with the president’s goals providing a spine but never getting in the way of the unfolding story.


    Reeves is unlikely to displace Lou Cannon as the Virgil of Reaganland. He spends too much time reciting the daily headlines; he sometimes loses sight of his central characters in the rush of events; the whole effect is of a story written from a distance rather than with insider’s knowledge. Still, for all these faults, “President Reagan” is a compelling read, fast-paced and scrupulously fair. The account of the Iran-contra affair is particularly gripping. Anybody who is interested in Reagan’s extraordinary presidency needs to reckon with Reeves.


    Reeves argues that Reagan was a master of both imagination and delegation. He stuck firmly to a small number of clear goals – reducing the size of government, restoring America’s power and pride, and facing down Communism – and then delegated implementation to the “fellas.” He did not so much do things as persuade others to do them for him. But his preference for delegation should not be confused with passivity. He insisted on using the phrase “tear down this wall” against the advice of his underlings, for example. The arms control deals that crowned his administration would have been impossible without his mixture of sci-fi fantasy and idealism. A Russian note taker who watched him carefully at two summit meetings likened him to an aged lion. If the prey was 10 feet away, he couldn’t be bothered to move; but when it wandered to within 8 feet, he suddenly came to life – and Reagan the negotiator dominated the room.


    Reagan’s imagination was fired by ideology but tempered by pragmatism. He was a product of the conservative revival of the 1950′s and 60′s, a revival that was driven by a combination of free-market enthusiasm and antitax fervor, superpatriotism and anti-Communism, religious revivalism and, to be frank, wild-eyed lunacy, and he possessed a rare gift for rendering conservative ideas into emotion-laden rhetoric. Even as a senior citizen in the White House, Reagan was a sucker for far-out conservative ideas: from the “space lasers” that were being championed in Human Events (which his aides tried to prevent him from reading) to Arthur Laffer’s supply-side economics.


    Yet this ideological zeal coexisted with a canny pragmatism. The man who slashed the top rate of tax in 1981 later raised taxes and fees by more than $80 billion a year; the man who championed “creative destruction” introduced “voluntary” export restraints on Japanese cars; and the man who denounced the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” ended up traveling to Moscow to visit his “friend” Mikhail Gorbachev. This provoked a growing rumble of criticism from the right during his presidency. As Reeves writes about the Moscow summit meeting: “The president threw an arm around Gorbachev’s shoulder as they walked along like a couple of guys coming off the field after the big game. That was just too much for America’s anti-Communist establishment.” But most of these former critics have long ago forgotten their complaints – and Reagan memorials are now springing up as fast as Wal-Marts. Among the many arts that conservatives have mastered is the art of fabricating heroes.


    Everybody will have his or her complaints about Reeves’s sins of omission. He could have said more about Reagan’s ideas (“good ones, bad ones and odd ones,” as he puts it). He could have said more about the influence of the American West in shaping a man who was given the Secret Service nickname Rawhide. But in one area Reeves scores a bull’s-eye: exposing the sheer strangeness of the Reagan years. Top billing goes to Iran-contra – that remarkable story of semi-privatized foreign policy and Reaganauts gone wild. But there are plenty of other gems: Reagan going to sleep during Gorbachev’s address to the Moscow conference; astrologers helping to decide everything from Reagan’s choice of George Bush as his running mate to the president’s schedule; the director of central intelligence, William Casey, mumbling so badly that Reagan couldn’t hear a word he said (“the mumbling leading the deaf,” according to one of the president’s men); and Reagan trying to persuade a Southern Democrat to support the sale of Awacs to Saudi Arabia by reminding him the Bible tells us that Armageddon will begin in the Middle East and involve the Russians. If Reeves were in the thriller business, he would be accused of stretching the bounds of credibility; as things are, readers will simply have to keep pinching themselves, checking Reeves’s footnotes and realizing that, yes, all this actually happened.


    Adrian Wooldridge is the Washington bureau chief of The Economist and the author, with John Micklethwait, of “The Right Nation: Conservative Power in America.”





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